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The dramatic growth of commodity index investment over the last decade has caused a
heated debate regarding its impact on commodity prices among legislators, practitioners and
academics. This paper focuses on the unique rolling activity of commodity index investors in
the commodity futures markets and shows that the price impact due to this rolling activity
is both statistically and economically significant. Two simple trading strategies, devised
to exploit this market anomaly, yielded excess returns with positive skewness and annual
Sharpe ratios as high as 4.4 in the period January 2000 to March 2010. The profitability
of these trading strategies is decreasing in the amount of arbitrage capital employed in the
futures markets and increasing in the size of index funds’ investment relative to the total
size of futures markets. Due to the price impact, index investors forwent on average 3.6%
annual return, a 48% higher Sharpe ratio of the return, and billions of dollars over this
period.
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CHAPTER 1. ABSTRACT 2
Chapter 1
Abstract
The dramatic growth of commodity index investment over the last decade has caused a
heated debate regarding its impact on commodity prices among legislators, practitioners and
academics. This paper focuses on the unique rolling activity of commodity index investors in
the commodity futures markets and shows that the price impact due to this rolling activity
is both statistically and economically significant. Two simple trading strategies, devised
to exploit this market anomaly, yielded excess returns with positive skewness and annual
Sharpe ratios as high as 4.4 in the period January 2000 to March 2010. The profitability
of these trading strategies is decreasing in the amount of arbitrage capital employed in the
futures markets and increasing in the size of index funds’ investment relative to the total
size of futures markets. Due to the price impact, index investors forwent on average 3.6%
annual return, a 48% higher Sharpe ratio of the return, and billions of dollars over this
period.
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Chapter 2
Introduction
Arbitrage is the basis of the efficient market hypothesis, as in theory, rational arbitrageurs
can engage in risk-less arbitrage to quickly eliminate any market anomalies. In reality, arbi-
trage opportunities are often limited, because arbitrageurs are typically capital-constrained
and any arbitrage carries some risks. Recent literature on limits to arbitrage (Shleifer and
Vishny, 1997) shows that a market anomaly can persist for a long period due to slow-moving
arbitrage capital and the resulting delayed arbitrage, as summarized by Duffie (2010). While
previous empirical evidence of limits to arbitrage was often found in equity and bond mar-
kets, in this paper I find a significant and persistent market anomaly in the commodity
futures markets, which are attracting more and more attention from legislators, investors
and economists. The market anomaly arises due to the increasing size of commodity index
investment and its mechanical rolling forward of futures contracts.
Commodity index investment experienced dramatic growth over the last decade and
now constitutes a significant fraction of investment in commodity futures markets. When
commodity prices reached dizzying heights in mid-2008, the value of total long positions
held by index investors reached $256 billion, up from about $6 billion in 1999. At the
same time, the average estimated ratio of these long positions relative to total open interest
increased from 6.7% in 1999 to 44% in mid-2008 across 19 largest commodity markets that
this paper studies. After the commodity prices collapsed in the fall of 2008, commodity
index investment dropped, but it quickly recovered. The value of index investors’ long
positions increased from $112 billion at the end of 2008 to $211 billion at the end of 2009,
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and the average estimated market ratio also increased from 39% to 52%. While there has
been a heated debate on the impact of this surge in index investment on commodity price
levels1, little attention has been devoted to the impact on a separate, but quantitatively at
least as important, component of index funds’ returns called the ”roll yield”, which depends
on the slope of commodity futures curves2.
This paper documents that the mechanical rolling forward of futures contracts explicit
in index funds’ investment strategies exerts large and time-varying price pressure on the
futures curve in the largest commodity markets. The estimated losses incurred by index
investors as a group, due to this price-pressure and arbitrageurs’ front-running of their
trades, amounted to $26 billion over the period 2000 to 2009, compared to the estimated
total management fees of about $5 billion. Commodity index investors also forwent on
average 3.6% annual return and a 48% higher Sharpe ratio of returns over this period.
The Standard and Poor’s-Goldman Sachs Commodity Index (SP-GSCI) was the first
commercially available commodity index and is also most popular. The SP-GSCI rolls
futures forward from the fifth business day to the ninth business day of each month, and
its rolling activity is usually called the Goldman roll by practitioners. To help understand
the Goldman roll and its impact, I use crude oil (WTI) as an example and look at a 15-
business-day window ending on February 13, 2001. The SP-GSCI rolled the futures of crude
oil (WTI) forward from February 7 to February 13 by shorting the March contracts and
longing the April contracts. Panel A of 2.1 shows the term structure of crude oil (WTI)
futures on February 7, 2001. As we can see, the slope was negative, which means contracts
with shorter maturities were trading at premiums. This kind of term structure is called
in backwardation by the literature. Because the March contract was more expensive, by
shorting the March contract at $31.27 and longing the April contract at $30.98, the SP-GSCI
1See Singleton (2010), Master and White (2008), Buyuksahin et al. (2008), Buyuksahin and Harris
(2009), Hamilton (2009), Kilian (2009), Stoll and Whaley (2010).
2Unlike equity index funds which invest directly in the underlying assets, commodity index funds obtain
commodity price exposure by entering long positions in commodity futures contracts. In order to maintain
the long exposure, the funds need to unwind the maturing contracts before they expire and initiate new
long positions in contracts that have later maturity dates. The roll yield refers to the difference between log
price of the maturing contract they roll from and the deferred contract they roll into.
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got a positive roll yield ln(31.27/30.98) = 0.93%.
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Figure 2.1: Related Plots of Crude Oil (WTI) Example
Panel B of 2.1 shows how the prices of the March and April contracts moved during the
15-day window. Although the two contracts shared the same general price pattern, their
prices were much closer during the rolling period. The difference between the prices of two
contracts is called the spread. As shown in Panel C and Panel D, the spreads and roll yields
were much lower in the rolling period. More importantly, we can clearly observe a large
$0.31 drop in spread and a 1.1% drop in roll yield when entering the rolling period. This
suggests that due to the large size of index investment, the shorting demand exerted by the
Goldman roll caused the March contract to be temporarily underpriced, and the longing
demand caused the April contract to be temporarily overpriced. The resulting price impact
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also caused the roll yield to drop.
The plots also indicate how this mispricing due to the price impact could be easily
exploited by long-short strategies similar to those used in the equity market. For example,
on January 24, we can short the March contract at $29.05, anticipating that it would be
relatively underpriced after 10 business days. At the same time, we long the April contract
at $28.31, expecting it to be relatively overpriced when the Goldman roll happens. In this
way, we create a calendar spread position with net value equal to the spread $0.74, and
our long-short spread position is not exposed to the change in absolute price level of crude
oil. After the mispricing happens on February 7 due to the Goldman roll, we unwind the
positions by longing the March contract and shorting the April contract to exactly offset
the positions of the SP-GSCI, paying the spread $0.29. This front-running strategy profits
from the drop in the spread $0.74−$0.29=$0.45, and if we post full collateral for the spread
position: $28.68 (=$29.05+$28.312 ), the strategy yields an unleveled excess return of 1.57% in
10 business days. In the real world, initiating such a spread position only requires 2-3%
margin of the nominal value, so the strategy can be easily implemented with very high
leverage. As indicated by the plots, this front-running strategy can still yield high excess
returns even if we initiate our positions just a few days before the Goldman roll.
I focus on 19 commodities in the SP-GSCI that are traded on US exchanges. These
commodities are very representative, because they have the largest and also the most liquid
commodity futures markets, with a total weight of 93.22% in the SP-GSCI in 2010. The
sample period is from January 1980 to March 2010. The year 2000 is set as a cut-off point,
because index investment was nonexistent or very small (less than $6 billion) before 2000.
Two simple trading strategies, like the one above, are designed to exploit the price impact.
The only difference is that Strategy 1 front-runs the Goldman roll by 10 business days, and
Strategy 2 front-runs it by just 5 business days. In the example above, Strategy 1 would
initiate spread positions from January 24 to January 30, and Strategy 2 would initiate
positions from January 31 to February 6. Both strategies unwind positions from February
7 to February 13, when the SP-GSCI rolls futures forward.
The 19 commodities are grouped in sectors to form 4 equally weighted sector portfolios
(agriculture, livestock, energy and metals) and one total portfolio. In the period 1980-
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1999, the portfolios’ Sharpe ratios were typically low or negative. However, in the period
2000-2010, both strategies yielded very high abnormal returns. Under the assumption
that capital was invested in risk-free assets when it was not utilized for the strategies, the
annualized Sharpe ratios ranged from 1.09 to 2.75 with Strategy 1, and ranged from 0.46
to 1.78 with Strategy 2. More importantly, the excess returns were positively skewed for
most portfolios, with a maximum skewness of 2.23 with Strategy 1 and 2.45 with Strategy
2. Energy sector is overall the best performing sector. With Strategy 1, the energy portfolio
has unleveled annual excess return of 4.43%, with annual Sharpe ratio of 2.2, skewness of
0.88 and maximum drawdown of 0.94%. From the perspective of a money manager who
has multiple trading opportunity and who only cares about performance in the trading
periods, the annualized Sharpe ratios ranged from 2.0 to 3.99 with Strategy 1, and ranged
from 1.16 to 4.39 with Strategy 2. Besides the metals portfolio, the mean of unlevered
annual excess returns ranged from 7.8% to 10.5% with Strategy 1, and ranged from 5.2%
to 10.8% with Strategy 2. A closer examination of the strategies’ performance reveals that
the exact choice of cut-off year is not important. For the energy and livestock portfolios,
the strategies’ excess returns were mostly positive as early as 1992, right after the launch
of the SP-GSCI in November 1991.
When the same strategies are applied to 18 commodities not included in the SP-GSCI,
there were no abnormal returns earned in either period. The annualized Sharpe ratios of
similar portfolios were either negative or very small, with a maximum of 0.31. Results
from panel regressions show that the average excess returns with both strategies were not
significantly different from 0 for either commodities out of the SP-GSCI over the full sample
period, or commodities in the SP-GSCI before the launch of the index (or the commodities’
inclusion into the SP-GSCI). After the commodities were included in the SP-GSCI, the
average excess return was 0.35% with Strategy 1 in 10 days and 0.24% with Strategy 2 in
5 days. Both are statistically significant at the 1% level.
All information about the Goldman roll is publicly available. What is more, compared
to the equity and bond markets, there are fewer barriers to arbitrage in commodity futures
markets. There is no short-sell constraint. Anyone can enter into both long and short
positions freely. High leverage can be easily obtained by the low margin requirements. The
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commodities in the SP-GSCI have very liquid futures markets, and the contracts involved in
the Goldman roll are also the most liquid contracts in each commodity market. If the market
was well arbitraged, we would not observe this market anomaly, because arbitrageurs would
quickly eliminate the price impact. However, the performance of the strategies suggests
that this market anomaly has persisted for a long period and arbitrage capital can be
slow-moving.
CFTC’s Commitment of Traders (COT) reports publish the number of positions held
by different traders in commodity futures market from 1986. I find little increase in the
number of spread positions held by speculators before 2004 in the 17 commodities’ futures
markets that have data available, which indicates that very few arbitrageurs were exploiting
the market anomaly before 2004. It could be due to the inattention of arbitrageurs to
commodity markets and thus their unawareness of this market anomaly. However, the
number of spread positions held by speculators has experienced a dramatic jump since 2004
in all 17 commodity markets, most more than 5-fold. It suggests that as commodity markets
and commodity index investment gained more attention from the investment community,
arbitrageurs were getting aware of the market anomaly, and more arbitrage capital was
utilized to exploit the price impact. Consistent with the limits to arbitrage theory, the
paper shows that the performances of front-running strategies are significantly related to
the net forces of the size of index investment and size of arbitrage capital utilized to take
advantage of the market anomaly. The arbitrage profit is lower when there is a reduction
in index investment or an increase in arbitrage capital.
The remainder of the introduction relates the paper to the literature. Section 2 describes
some facts about commodity index investment and the Goldman roll. Section 3 presents
the empirical analysis. Section 4 concludes.
2.1 Related Literature
There is a large literature on limits to arbitrage, as summarized by Shleifer (2000), Barberis
and Thaler (2001) and Duffie (2010). In theory, arbitrageurs often have to bear three kinds
of risks: fundamental risk (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997), noise trader risk (Delong et al.,
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1990) and synchronization risk (Abreu and Brunnermeier, 2002). These risks can prevent
arbitrageurs from eliminating a market anomaly quickly and thus cause delayed arbitrage.
Duffie (2010) proposed that arbitrageurs’ inattention can also cause slow-moving arbitrage
capital and delayed arbitrage. In this paper, I contribute an empirical example of limits
to arbitrage in commodity futures markets. Here, there are two possible explanations for
the persistence of the market anomaly. One is the limited knowledge of the existence of
the market anomaly, which is consistent with the theory of inattentive arbitrageurs. The
anomaly can also persist due to the fundamental risk involved in the arbitrage. Although
the mispriced futures contracts have the same underlying commodity, they are still not
perfect substitutes for each other because their maturities are different. The fundamental
value of this partially hedged portfolio might change due to exogenous demand shocks or a
supply crunch, which could lead to a loss for arbitrageurs. The concern of this fundamental
risk may delay the action of arbitrageurs, especially when the price impact of commodity
index investment was not large enough.
Many empirical studies on limits to arbitrage focus on the effects of index investment in
the equity market. First is the inclusion effect. Petajisto (2010) shows that in the period
1990-2005, prices increased an average 8.8% around the event for stocks added to the S&P
500, and dropped -15.1% if the stocks are deleted from the index3. The effect generally
grew with the size of index fund assets. Second, Morck and Yang (2001) and Cremers,
Petajisto and Zitzewitz (2010) find significantly large price premiums attached to index
membership. Third, Kaul, Mehrotra and Morck (2000) show that when the index increased
the weights of stocks, prices experienced significant increases during the event week with no
reversal afterwards, even when the adjustment was previously announced. In this paper, I
extend the research into commodity markets, and find that commodity index investors get
significantly lower roll yields due to the price impact of their mechanical rolling activity.
The paper is also related to a classic theory called the Theory of Normal Backwarda-
tion (Keynes (1930), Hicks (1939) and Cootner (1967)) in commodity markets. The theory
emphasizes the interaction between hedgers and speculators. In the theory, the commod-
3Other studies of this effect include Harris and Gurel (1986), Shleifer (1986), Lynch and Mendenhall
(1997), Chen, Noronha and Singal (2004), and many others.
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ity producers are typically the hedgers and short futures contracts due to risk aversion.
Speculators earn a risk premium by taking long positions to meet the hedging demand of
producers. Empirical evidence4 shows that the risk premium is higher when the producers’
hedging demand is higher. Commodity indices were originally designed to capture this risk
premium, so index investors are often called index speculators. However, in this paper,
index investors are actually the hedgers. Because the commodity index funds and banks
selling swaps have to follow the exact rolling rules of the indices they track in order to fully
hedge themselves, they have great hedging demand when they roll futures contracts forward.
By meeting this hedging demand, speculators could earn very high excess returns. Hirsh-
leifer’s (1988, 1990) theoretical models indicate that in equilibrium a friction to investing in
commodity futures must exist for the hedging demand to affect prices. Bessembinder and
Lemmon (2002) model this friction as the absence of storage in electricity markets, while
Acharya, Lochstoer and Ramadorai (2010) model the friction as the limit on the risk-taking
capacity of speculators. Here, the friction arises from the restriction of index investors to
follow fixed rolling rules, which are publicly known.
4See Carter, Rausser and Schmitz (1983), Chang (1985), Bessembinder (1992), de Roon, Nijman and
Veld (2000) and Acharya, Lochstoer and Ramadorai (2010).
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Chapter 3
Commodity Index Investment
Commodity index investment has become increasingly popular among institutional and in-
dividual investors in recent years. The first commercially available commodity index was
launched at the end of 1991, and now there are hundreds of different indices. Institutional
investors, such as pension funds and endowment funds, usually enter into over-the-counter
(OTC) commodity index swaps with big banks. In a typical commodity index swap, the
institutional investor pays the 3-month Treasury-bill rate plus a management fee to a Wall
Street bank, and the bank pays the total return on a particular commodity index. The
management fee ranges from 0.5% to 1% per year depending on the index and nominal
amount. Institutional investors can also put their funds under the management of a com-
modity index fund, which tracks a particular index. For individual investors, the main
investment channel is to buy exchanged-traded funds (ETFs) and notes (ETNs) which are
tied to particular indices. The management fees associated with ETFs or ETNs are typi-
cally higher than the fees of swaps. Like other index investors, commodity index investors
are usually long-term investors and mostly passive in the sense that there is no attempt
to time the market or identify under-priced commodities. Most of the indices only take
long positions in futures contracts1, and all the positions are fully collateralized, with the
collateral invested in 3-month Treasury bills.
1Starting from 2006, some new commodity indices take both long and short positions depending on the
term structures and other factors, like the Morningstar long and short commodity index. However, the
majority of commodity indices still only take long positions.
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The Standard and Poor’s-Goldman Sachs Commodity Index (SP-GSCI) and the Dow
Jones-UBS Commodity Index (DJ-UBSCI) are the two most popular commodity indices
and used as industry benchmarks. According to Masters and White (2008), the estimated
market share was approximately 63% for the SP-GSCI and 32% for the DJ-UBSCI in 2008.
The SP-GSCI was the first commercially available commodity index and was launched in
November 1991. It includes 24 commodities now, and the composition has remained the
same since 2002. The DJ-UBSCI was launched in July 1998 and includes 19 commodities,
18 of which it shares with the SP-GSCI. The weighting schemes of the two indices are
different. The weights in the SP-GSCI are primarily based on the delayed five-year rolling
averages of world production quantities, while the DJ-UBSCI chooses weights based on
liquidity and world production values, where liquidity is the dominant factor2. Since the
SP-GSCI is the most popular index and includes almost all commodities in the DJ-UBSCI
and other indices, I will focus on the 19 commodities in the SP-GSCI that are traded on US
exchanges3. These commodities also have the largest futures markets, and will be referred
to as index commodities. 3.1 lists these commodities and their weights in the two indices
in 20104. The aggregate weights of the 19 commodities are 93.44% in the SP-GSCI and
78.21% in the DJ-USBCI in 2010, so they are very representative. As shown in Table 1,
the SP-GSCI is heavily weighted on the energy sector, with a total weight of 69.25% and a
crude oil weight of 50.05%. The weights in the DJ-UBSCI are more evenly dispersed, and
the total energy weight is only 33%.
2The DJ-UBSCI also impose lower bound of 2% for individual weight and upper bound of 33% for sector
weight.
3I exclude six industrial metals that are traded on London Metal Exchange (LME), because the maturity
structure of the futures contracts listed on LME is very different from that in US. The maturities of these
futures contracts range from one day to 3 months consecutively. It is not clear which contracts these indices
choose and how they roll the contracts forward.
4The weights are taken in 2010. The index committee may revise the weights depending on various factors

































Trading Commodity SP-GSCI DJ-UBSCI Futures Maturity of contracts at Month Begin
Facility (Contracts) Weights Weights Since 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Agriculture (8 Commodities)
ICE Cocoa 0.36% 0.0% 1964.12 H H K K N N U U Z Z Z H
ICE Coffee ”C” 0.78% 2.56% 1972.08 H H K K N N U U Z Z Z H
CBOT Corn 3.99% 7.09% 1964.12 H H K K N N U U Z Z Z H
ICE Cotton #2 0.96% 2.00% 1964.12 H H K K N N Z Z Z Z Z H
CBOT Soybean 2.77% 7.91% 1964.12 H H K K N N X X X X F F
ICE Sugar #11 1.92% 2.89% 1964.12 H H K K N N V V V H H H
KBOT Wheat (Kansas) 0.86% 0.0% 1970.01 H H K K N N U U Z Z Z H
CBOT Wheat 4.05% 4.70% 1964.12 H H K K N N U U Z Z Z H
Livestock (3 Commodities)
CME Feeder Cattle 0.56% 0.0% 1972.03 H H J K Q Q Q U V X F F
CME Lean Hogs 1.54% 2.10% 1966.02 G J J M M N Q V V Z Z G
CME Live Cattle 3.01% 3.55% 1964.12 G J J M M Q Q V V Z Z G
Energy (6 Commodities)
ICE Crude Oil (Brent) 13.14% 0.0% 1989.07 H J K M N Q U V X Z F G
NYMEX Crude Oil (WTI) 36.91% 14.34% 1983.03 G H J K M N Q U V X Z F
ICE Gasoil 4.78% 0.0% 1986.06 G H J K M N Q U V X Z F
NYMEX Gasoline (RBOB) 4.56% 3.53% 1984.12 G H J K M N Q U V X Z F
NYMEX Heating Oil #2 4.54% 3.58% 1978.11 G H J K M N Q U V X Z F
NYMEX Natural Gas 5.32% 11.55% 1990.04 G H J K M N Q U V X Z F
Metals (2 Commodities)
NYMEX Gold 2.86% 9.12% 1974.12 G J J M M Q Q Z Z Z Z G
NYMEX Silver 0.31% 3.29% 1964.12 H H K K N N U U Z Z Z H
F: January G: February H: March J: April K: May M: June N: July Q: August U: September V: October X: November Z: December
Table 3.1: Commodity Futures, Their Weights in SP-GSCI and DJ-UBSCI and Rolling Scheme
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Commodity index investments give investors exposure to commodity prices. There is
both academic and industry research that suggests that even when a commodity index
may be a poor stand-alone investment, it is still desirable because of the hedging against
inflation and the diversification benefit added to the investors’ total portfolio. Gorton
and Rouwenhorst (2006) find that over the period between July 1959 and March 2004,
the returns of investing in commodity futures were negatively correlated with equity and
bond returns, but positively correlated with inflation. Based on the examination of asset
class data from 1970 to 2004, Idzorek (2006) shows that by adding commodity indices to the
portfolio, the average improvement in historical return at each risk level (standard deviation
range of approximately 2.4% to 19.8%) was approximately 1.33%, with a maximum of 1.88%.
However, a recent study by Tang and Xiong (2010) find that with the boom of commodity
index investments, commodity prices have been increasingly exposed to market-wide shocks,
and shocks to other commodities, such as oil. Therefore, it is unknown whether or not the
diversification benefit of commodity index investment is sustainable in the future.
3.1 The Goldman Roll
Since futures contracts have expiration dates, to maintain the long exposure to commodity
prices, commodity indices need to roll the positions forward, i.e., by closing the long po-
sitions in the maturing contracts and initiating new long positions in contracts that have
later maturity dates. 3.1 shows the rolling scheme of the SP-GSCI by listing the maturities
of the futures contracts held by the index on the first business day of each calendar month.
If the index holds different contracts at the beginnings of two consecutive months, it means
that the index rolls futures forward in the first month. For example, the SP-GSCI holds
the March and May wheat contracts at the beginning of February and March respectively,
so the index rolls the wheat futures forward in February by closing the March contracts
and initiating the May contacts. Since the liquidity of contracts drops very quickly as the
maturity increases, commodity indices usually hold contracts with short maturities. Differ-
ent commodities have different rolling frequencies. Agricultural commodities are typically
rolled forward 4 or 5 times a year. The livestock commodities are rolled forward a bit more
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frequently, 6 to 8 times a year. The SP-GSCI rolls the energy commodities every month.
Gold and silver are rolled forward 5 times a year. The rolling scheme of the DJ-UBSCI
is the same for most commodities except energy commodities, which the DJ-UBSCI rolls
every two months.
In the rolling month, both the SP-GSCI and DJ-UBSCI have a rolling period of 5
business days. The SP-GSCI starts on the fifth business day of the month, and ends on
the ninth business day, while the DJ-UBSCI rolls from the sixth business day to the tenth
business day, so the rolling periods of the two indices greatly overlap. Many other indices
and ETFs also roll in this period, like the former Lehman Brothers Commodity Index and
the largest crude oil ETF: United States Oil Fund (USO). On each day in the rolling period,
both indices roll forward 20% of the positions for commodities that need to be rolled. Since
the DJ-UBSCI’s rolling rules are mostly the same as the SP-GSCI and the SP-GSCI is much
more popular, in the following empirical analysis, I will focus on the rolling activity of the
SP-GSCI, which is called the Goldman roll by practitioners.
The total excess return of investing in futures consists of spot return and roll yield.
Spot return captures the price change of the futures contracts that investor holds. Roll
yield (also called roll return) captures the slope of futures curve when investors roll futures
forward. From now on, the contracts held by the SP-GSCI will be referred to as the maturing
contracts, and the contracts that the SP-GSCI rolls into will be referred to as the deferred
contracts. Suppose the price of the maturing contract is Ft,T1 at time t with maturity T1,
and Ft,T2 is the price of the deferred contract with maturity T2, where T2 > T1. The roll
yield is defined as
Roll Y ield = ln(Ft,T1)− ln(Ft,T2) (1)
When the maturing contract is more expensive Ft,T1 > Ft,T2 , the term structure is
usually called in backwardation and the roll yield is positive. When the maturing contract
is at a discount Ft,T1 < Ft,T2 , the term structure is called in contango and the roll yield is
negative.
Historically, the roll yield is an important component of the total excess return. Anson
(1998) shows that the roll yield provided most of commodity investments’ total excess
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return in the period between 1985 and 1997, and in the case of the SP-GSCI, the average
annual roll yield was 6.11% while the average spot return was -0.08%. Nash (2001) and
Feldman and Till (2006) find that from 1983 to 2004, whether a commodity was in structural
backwardation or not largely determined its returns, and roll yield has been the dominant
driver of commodity futures returns.
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Chapter 4
Empirical Analysis
The daily prices for individual commodity’s futures contracts are obtained from the Com-
modity Research Bureau (CRB) and the full sample period is from January 2, 1980 to
March 31, 20101. In the following analysis, the year 2000 is often set as a cutoff point, since
commodity index investment was nonexistent or very small (less than $6 billion) before
20002. To facilitate the analysis, I form a control group using 18 commodities not included
in the SP-GSCI with futures trading on US exchanges since 2005 or earlier. These com-
modities will be referred to as out-of-index commodities. I apply a similar rolling scheme
as the SP-GSCI by matching the sector and maturity structures of futures markets. The
rolling periods of these commodities are exactly the same as the SP-GSCI. 4.1 lists the com-
modities in this control group3 and the rolling scheme. Many commodities in the control
1I exclude the sample before 1980 due to the following considerations. First, there could be some potential
structural changes in commodity futures markets, so the data further back may not be so relevant. Second,
the SP-GSCI is heavily weighted on energy sector, and the first energy commodity futures (heating oil)
started trading at the end of 1979. Third, I check the empirical analysis using all available data and the
results are very similar. The results using whole history are available upon request.
2The exact choice of the cutoff point is not important, and would not change the results.
3The soybean oil is actually included in the DJ-UBSCI and some smaller indices, but the weight is very
low. The orange juice is also included in some smaller indices. The copper here is traded on NYMEX, so
it is not the same contract which the SP-GSCI and DJ-USBCI hold. I put milk and butter in the livestock
sector because they are produced by livestock and I can have more than one commodity in livestock sector
when I form sector portfolios later.
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Trading Commodity Futures Data Maturity of contracts at Month Begin
Facility (Contracts) Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Agriculture (8 Commodities)
CME Lumber 1969.10–2010.3 H H K K N N U U X X F F
CBOT Oats 1959.7–2010.3 H H K K N N U U Z Z Z H
ICE Orange Juice 1967.2–2010.3 H H K K N N U U X X F F
CBOT Rough Rice 1986.8–2010.3 H H K K N N U U X X F F
CBOT Soybean Meal 1959.7–2010.3 H H K K N N V V V F F F
CBOT Soybean Oil 1959.7–2010.3 H H K K N N V V V F F F
ICE Sugar #14 1985.7–2008.2 H H K K N N U U X X F F
MGEX Wheat, Spring 1970.1–2010.3 H H K K N N U U Z Z Z H
Livestock (3 Commodities)
CME Butter 1996.9–2010.3 G H K K N N U U V Z Z G
CME Milk, Class III 1996.1–2010.3 G J J M M N U U Z Z Z G
CME Pork Bellies 1966.2–2010.3 G H K K N N Q G G G G G
Energy (4 Commodities)
NYMEX Coal 2001.7–2010.3 G H J K M N Q U V X Z F
NYMEX Electricity, PJM 2003.4–2010.3 G H J K M N Q U V X Z F
CBOT Ethanol 2005.3–2010.3 G H J K M N Q U V X Z F
NYMEX Propane 1987.8–2009.9 G H J K M N Q U V X Z F
Metals (3 Commodities)
NYMEX Copper 1959.7–2010.3 G H J K M N Q U V X Z F
NYMEX Palladium 1977.1–2010.3 H H M M M U U U Z Z Z H
NYMEX Platinum 1968.3–2010.3 J J J N N N V V V F F F
Table 4.1: Commodities Futures out of the SP-GSCI and their Rolling Scheme
group are closely related to some index commodities.
4.1 Preliminary Evidence of Price Impact
Given the massive size of investment tied to the SP-GSCI, when it rolls futures forward, the
large shorting demand of the maturing contract (being rolled from) could potentially push
its price down, while the large longing demand of the deferred contract (being rolled into)
could push its price up4. Together, the resulting price impact would cause the roll yield to
drop in the rolling period. In the following analysis, I will provide some preliminary and
4Some market participants state that they tend to avoid trading in the SP-GSCI rolling periods if they
want to do similar trading as the SP-GSCI does.
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visual evidence based on this intuition to show the existence of the price impact.
First, a 15-business-day window is constructed to examine the change of roll yields,
with the last five days being the rolling dates of the SP-GSCI. This window is labeled
”rolling window”. Days after SP-GSCI’s rolling period are not included here, because for
energy commodities, after the SP-GSCI unwinds the maturing contracts, these contracts
typically have less than a week before the last trading days. Previous empirical studies
usually exclude such contracts with just a few days to expire, because these contracts have
great liquidity concerns. The full sample is divided into two sub-samples: 1980-1999 and
2000-2010. 4.1 shows the average roll yields (in percentage) of four representative index
commodities (crude oil WTI, heating oil, gasoline RBOB and live cattle) over the rolling
window in the two periods.
The plots in 4.1 reveal some interesting facts. First, before 2000, the average roll yields
were positive on every day for all 4 commodities. It is consistent with the findings of
Litzenberger and Rabinowitz (1995) and Casassus and Collin-Dufresne (2005) that these
commodities were often in backwardation. In the period 2000-2010, the average roll yields
dropped, especially in the SP-GSCI’s rolling period. Second and more interestingly, before
2000, the roll yields showed no clear trend in the window, and the average roll yields in
the SP-GSCI’s rolling period were not significantly lower than the average roll yields in the
first 5 days of the window. The roll yields were also very smooth across the days. However,
in the period 2000-2010, we can observe very clear drops of roll yields when entering SP-
GSCI’s rolling period, especially for 3 energy commodities. There are decreasing trends for
all commodities, and the average roll yields in the SP-GSCI’s rolling period are much lower
than the average roll yields in the first 5 days, with statistical significance at the 1% level
for three energy commodities and at the 5% level for live cattle.
There are also some drops of roll yields from day 6 to day 10, which could be due to the
price impact of some other commodity indices that roll futures forward a little earlier than
the SP-GSCI. For example, the Reuters/Jefferies-CRB Index (CRB) rolls futures forward
between the 1st and 4th business days of the rolling month (day 7 to day 10), and the
Deutsche Bank Liquid Commodity Index (DBLCI) has a rolling period which is between
the 2nd and 6th business day (day 8 to day 11).
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Figure 4.1: Average Roll Yields of Index Commodities over the 15-day Rolling Window
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Second, I examine an alternative 15-business-day window, with the last day being one
day earlier than the first day of the rolling window, so the two windows are consecutive. As
shown in 4.2, there were no clear trends over the window and drops on any particular day
for all commodities in both time periods. The average roll yields in the last 5 days of the
window were not significantly lower than the average roll yields in the first 5 days. In the
case of gasoline and heating oil, the average roll yields in the two periods were very close
to each on each day.
















































































































Figure 4.2: Average Roll Yield of Index Commodities over an Alternative 15-day Window
Finally, to further confirm that the unique pattern is caused by the price impact of the
Goldman roll, I pick four representative out-of-index commodities from the control group
and examine the change of roll yields in the rolling window. These four commodities are
soybean meal, pork belly, propane and copper, one from each sector. As shown in 4.3,
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the results form clear contrasts to the results of index commodities in the rolling window,
but are very similar to the results of index commodities in the alternative window. For
all 4 commodities in both periods, there were no clear trends and no significant differences
between the average roll yields in the first and last 5 days. Also there were no clear drops
of roll yields when entering the rolling period for all 4 commodities in the period 2000-2010.










































































































Figure 4.3: Average Roll Yield of Out-of-Index Commodities over the Rolling Window
In sum, the time-series and cross-sectional evidence above is very supportive of the
existence of the price impact due to the Goldman roll. To provide further and more rigorous
evidence, I will design two simple trading strategies to capture the price impact in the next
section and show how both statistically and economically significant the price impact was.
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4.2 Front-Running the Goldman Roll
The idea is that since the Goldman roll would cause the maturing contracts to be tem-
porarily underpriced and the deferred contracts to be overpriced, we can create long-short
positions to capture this price impact. One can either front-run by creating the positions
before the Goldman roll or back-run by creating positions at the same time as the Goldman
roll. Because there is liquidity concern of maturing contracts after the Goldman roll and
the front-running offers more flexibility, I will only focus on front-running strategies.
Assuming that the price of the maturing contract (being rolled from) is Ft,T1 , and the
deferred contract (being rolled into) has price Ft,T2 , then the spread
SP T1,T2t = Ft,T1 − Ft,T2 (5)
is the amount of gain (or loss) per unit of the commodity when rolling futures forward. It is
also the value of a calendar spread position which shorts one unit of the maturing contract,
and longs one unit of the deferred contract. This long-short spread position is not subject to
the change in absolute price level, and is ideal to capture the full impact of price pressures
exerted by the Goldman roll in both directions.
Without price impact, the spread SP T1,T2t should be roughly the same over a short time
window. With price impact, the spread should decrease in the rolling period because the
maturing contract’s price Ft,T1 would be pushed down and the deferred contract’s price
Ft,T2 would be pushed up. The front-running strategy is designed to capture this drop of
spread by shorting the maturing contracts and longing the deferred contracts before the
SP-GSCI’s rolling period. The spread positions are then unwound and exactly offset the
SP-GSCI’s positions when it roll futures forward5.
I focus on the rolling window analyzed in the last section6. The 15-day window is
equally divided into three groups. The formal trading strategies are designed as follows.
5One can also create a butterfly spread position to reduce some exposure to the slope of the futures
curve. The butterfly spread position will capture the change in the convexity of the curve, and consists of
long positions in the deferred contracts and short positions in the maturing contracts and contracts with
maturities later than that of the deferred contracts.
6From 4.2, we can see that moving further ahead of the rolling window would not help the performance
a lot.
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With Strategy 1in each month, I first identify the commodities that the SP-GSCI will
roll forward. For such commodities, calendar spread positions are created on each day in
the first group, which runs from 10 to 6 business days before the SP-GSCI’s first rolling
date. The calendar spread position involves shorting the maturing contracts that the SP-
GSCI is currently holding and longing the deferred contracts that it will roll into. In this
way, I create the same spread positions as the Goldman roll, except I do it 10 days earlier.
The calendar spread positions will be unwound in the SP-GSCI’s rolling period. Like the
SP-GSCI, I create 20% of the total spread positions each day and also unwind 20% each
day.
Strategy 2 follows the same methodology except front-running the Goldman roll by
just 5 days. The spread positions are created in the second group of days, which runs
from 5 to 1 business day before the first rolling date of the SP-GSCI. Basically, Strategy
1 captures the spread change in 10 days and Strategy 2 captures the spread change in 5
days. Since both strategies are implemented in very short periods, if they earn very high
abnormal excess returns, it is very unlikely to be caused by factors other than the price
impact of the Goldman roll. There are multiple ways to improve the simple strategies, but
the idea here is to show how the most simple and straightforward strategy would perform.
For commodity i, the excess return of Strategy j (j = 1, 2), from day tj when the spread
position is created to day t
′
when the position is unwound, is defined as follows
ri,jt =
SP i,T1,T2tj − SP i,T1,T2t′














This return is an excess return because the collateral earns the interest of risk-free rates. I
also assume that both strategies invest the capital in the risk-free asset when they are not
front-running the Goldman roll, so if the SP-GSCI rolls commodity i forward in the month,
the monthly excess return of investing in commodity i with Strategy j is just the 5-day
average of ri,jt , otherwise the monthly excess return is zero.
The 19 commodities are grouped by sector to form equally weighted portfolios (agri-
culture, energy, livestock and metals), and a total portfolio using all commodities. In each
month, the portfolio’s return is the average return of the commodities that the SP-GSCI
rolls forward in this portfolio during the month. Equation (6) indicates that the calendar
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spread position is fully collateralized, so the excess return ri,jt involves no leverage. In prac-
tice, the margin requirement is about 10-15% of the nominal value for creating an outright
futures position, and only 2-4% for initiating a calendar spread position, so both strategies
can be easily implemented using very high leverage in the real world.
4.2.1 Performance of the Strategies
Similar to the previous analysis, I divided the full sample period into two sub-periods:
1980-1999 and 2000-2010. 4.2 reports the summary statistics of the five portfolios’ monthly
excess returns (in percentage). The difference of performances in the two periods is striking.
Let us first discuss Strategy 1.
First, the mean excess returns of all 5 portfolios were very significantly positive in
the period 2000-2010, and much larger than the mean excess returns before 2000. In the
period 1980-1999, besides the metals portfolio, the mean excess returns ranged from -0.006%
(energy) to 0.13% (agriculture) monthly, while in the period 2000-2010, the mean excess
returns increased to a range of 0.31% (total) to 0.42% (livestock) monthly. The mean excess
return was relatively small in magnitude for the metals portfolio, but still it increased from
-0.028% before 2000 to 0.033% since 2000 (monthly).
Second, the monthly Sharpe ratios surged to very high levels in the period 2000-2010,
ranging from 0.32 (agriculture) to 0.79 (total). In the period 1980-1999, besides the agri-
culture portfolio, the monthly Sharpe ratios of the other 4 portfolios were typically not high
or even negative, ranging from -0.14 (metals) to 0.15 (total). The jumps in monthly Sharpe
ratios were especially striking for three portfolios: energy portfolio (from -0.007 to 0.64),
metals portfolio (from -0.14 to 0.55) and total portfolio (from 0.15 to 0.79).
Third, except for the agriculture portfolio, 4 portfolios’ excess returns were positively
skewed in the period 2000-2010, with skewness ranging from 0.13 (total) to 2.23 (metals).
This makes it more difficult to explain the high Sharpe ratios with risk based theories. In
contrast, in the period 1980-1999, the skewness was slightly positive 0.19 for the livestock

























Agriculture Energy Livestock Metals Total
1980-1999 2000-2010 1980-1999 2000-2010 1980-1999 2000-2010 1980-1999 2000-2010 1980-1999 2000-2010
Strategy 1
Mean 0.13 0.23 -0.006 0.37 0.12 0.42 -0.03 0.033 0.06 0.31
T-stat 3.29 3.50 -0.11 7.05 1.96 5.34 -2.17 6.14 2.36 8.81
Std 0.61 0.73 0.81 0.58 0.93 0.86 0.20 0.06 0.41 0.39
Skewness 1.78 -2.61 -0.71 0.88 0.19 0.74 -3.12 2.23 -0.17 0.13
Kurtosis 9.93 35.1 6.69 4.45 3.83 5.55 24.6 12.8 3.32 5.75
Min -1.84 -5.39 -3.82 -0.88 -2.93 -1.72 -1.66 -0.087 -1.19 -1.22
Max 2.73 3.73 2.66 2.38 3.22 4.32 0.69 0.39 1.06 1.70
Sharpe Ratio 0.21 0.32 -0.007 0.64 0.13 0.48 -0.14 0.55 0.15 0.79
Max Drawdown 2.09 5.39 22.40 0.94 8.73 7.53 7.40 0.09 5.25 1.44
# of obs 240 123 240 123 240 123 240 123 240 123
Strategy 2
Mean 0.05 0.07 0.027 0.21 0.01 0.13 -0.013 0.019 0.02 0.13
T-stat 2.13 1.47 0.66 4.81 0.25 2.33 -1.65 5.71 0.97 4.53
Std 0.38 0.51 0.64 0.50 0.62 0.61 0.12 0.04 0.31 0.31
Skewness -1.15 -1.40 0.09 2.45 -0.07 0.12 -3.34 0.76 -0.16 -0.61
Kurtosis 12.9 33.4 7.13 15.8 4.38 3.97 21.2 5.40 4.34 11.0
Min -1.91 -3.63 -2.44 -0.81 -2.14 -1.69 -0.85 -0.08 -0.94 -1.53
Max 1.54 3.06 2.85 3.37 2.07 2.25 0.3 0.15 1.27 1.35
Sharpe Ratio 0.17 0.16 0.04 0.43 0.02 0.21 -0.12 0.62 0.06 0.41
Max Drawdown 2.87 3.63 15.09 2.61 17.26 5.19 3.40 0.08 9.34 2.05
# of obs 240 123 240 123 240 123 240 123 240 123
Table 4.2: Summary Statistics of Monthly Excess Returns with Two Trading Strategies
CHAPTER 4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 27
Finally, in the period 2000-2010, 4 portfolios experienced big drops in the maximum
drawdown. The most dramatic ones are energy and metals portfolio, whose maximum
drawdowns dropped from 22.4% before 2000 to only 0.94% and from 7.4% to 0.09% respec-
tively.
The results for Strategy 2 are similar, and even stronger in some cases. Besides the
agriculture portfolio, the mean excess returns of the other 4 portfolios were not significantly
different from zero before 2000, ranging from -0.013% (metals) to 0.027% (energy), but they
became very positive and highly significant in the period 2000-2010, ranging from 0.019%
(metals) to 0.22% (energy). The monthly Sharpe ratios of these 4 portfolios ranged from
-0.11 (metals) to 0.06 (total) before 2000, and increased to the range of 0.21 (livestock) to
0.52 (metals) since 2000. The skewness of excess return also increased a lot for the energy,
livestock and metals portfolios, among which the energy portfolio experienced a jump from
0.09 before 2000 to 2.45 since 2000 in skewness.
Panel A of 4.3 reports the summary statistics of the portfolios’ annualized excess returns
in the period 2000-2010. The annual Sharpe ratios ranged from 1.09 (agriculture) to 2.75
(total) with Strategy 1, and from 0.46 (agriculture) to 1.78 (metals) with Strategy 2. So
far the capital is assumed to be invested in the risk-free assets when not utilized for front-
running. However, a large hedge fund could use the capital to invest in other assets and
trading strategies, so the fund manager may only care about the performance in the period
when the capital is actually used. The excess returns with Strategy 1 were actually 10-day
returns and should be annualized by multiplying by a factor of 252/10. Similarly, the excess
returns with Strategy 2 were 5-day returns and should be annualized by a factor of 252/5. As
reported in Panel B of 4.3, the annualized Sharpe ratios now are much higher, ranging from
2.0 (agriculture) to 3.99 (total) with Strategy 1 and from 1.16 (agriculture) to 4.39 (metals)
with Strategy 2. Besides the metals portfolio, the means of unlevered annual excess returns
ranged from 7.8% (total) to 10.47% (livestock) with Strategy 1, and ranged from 5.16%
(agriculture) to 10.8% (energy) with Strategy 2. Therefore, the strategies’ performance is
much better from the perspective of a money manager with multiple investing opportunities.
The CRB data set does not have data on the bid-ask-spreads, so I can not incorporate
transaction costs into the evaluation of the strategies. However, since the index commodities
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Panel A: Annualized by Month
Agriculture Energy Livestock Metals Total
Strategy 1
Mean 2.74% 4.43% 4.99% 0.40% 3.71%
Std 2.51% 2.01% 2.99% 0.21% 1.35%
Skewness −2.61 0.88 0.74 2.23 0.13
Sharpe Ratio 1.09 2.20 1.67 1.92 2.75
Strategy 2
Mean 0.81% 2.58% 1.53% 0.23% 1.52%
Std 1.76% 1.72% 2.11% 0.13% 1.08%
Skewness −1.40 2.45 0.12 0.76 −0.61
Sharpe Ratio 0.46 1.50 0.73 1.78 1.41
Panel B: Annualized by Trading Days
Agriculture Energy Livestock Metals Total
Strategy 1
Mean 8.74% 9.30% 10.47% 1.12% 7.80%
Std 4.38% 2.92% 4.34% 0.33% 1.95%
Skewness −2.69 0.88 0.74 1.82 0.13
Sharpe Ratio 2.00 3.19 2.41 3.36 3.99
Strategy 2
Mean 5.16% 10.82% 6.43% 1.29% 6.40%
Std 4.44% 3.52% 4.32% 0.29% 2.21%
Skewness −1.32 2.45 0.12 0.34 −0.61
Sharpe Ratio 1.16 3.08 1.49 4.39 2.90
Table 4.3: Summary Statistics of Annualized Excess Returns in 2000-2010
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have the most liquid markets among all commodities, and the contracts involved in the
Goldman roll are also the most liquid contracts in each market, the transaction costs are
quite low. The typical bid-ask-spread is only a few bps (basis points) of the futures price.
For crude oil (WTI), the bid-ask-spread is often just 1 bp. In addition, since the trading
volumes tend to increase a lot in the SP-GSCI’s rolling period, the bid-ask-spread can be
even lower when the strategies unwind the spread positions. Therefore, the strategies should
still be very profitable even after taking into account the transaction costs, especially in the
most liquid energy sector.








































Figure 4.4: Average Monthly Excess Returns of the Four Sector Portfolios with Strategy 1
Now let us focus on Strategy 1 and take a closer look at the excess returns year by
year. 4.4 shows each year the average monthly excess returns (in percentage) of the 4
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sector portfolios. The energy and livestock portfolios actually had mostly positive excess
returns as early as 1992, right after the launch of the SP-GSCI. For the metals portfolio,
the average excess returns were mostly negative before 2000, and then stayed positive every
year from 2000. The agriculture portfolio is quite different from the other 3 portfolios. The
average excess returns have been mostly positive in the whole sample period, and there
was a cyclical pattern before 2003. However, since 2003, the cyclical pattern disappeared
and the average excess returns have stayed positive every year. The plots indicate that the
exact choice of the cutoff year is not very important, and the results could be even better
if the cutoff year is moved a few years earlier.
As a comparison, the same trading strategies are applied to the control group with the
18 out-of-index commodities. Similarly, four equally weighted sector portfolios and one
total portfolio are formed. 4.4 reports the summary statistics of these 5 portfolios’ monthly
excess returns in the same two periods: 1980-1999 and 2000-2010. The results form a very
clear contrast to the results in Table 3. With both strategies in both periods, most of the 5
portfolios’ mean excess returns were not significantly different from 0, or even significantly
negative in some cases. The monthly Sharpe ratios were all either negative or close to zero,
with a maximum of 0.09 obtained by the energy portfolio with Strategy 1 before 2000.
What is more, with Strategy 1, except for the livestock portfolio, the mean excess returns
and Sharpe ratios actually dropped in the period 2000-2010 for 4 portfolios. With Strategy


























Agriculture Energy Livestock Metals Total
1980-1999 2000-2010 1980-1999 2000-2010 1980-1999 2000-2010 1980-1999 2000-2010 1980-1999 2000-2010
Strategy 1
Mean 0.02 -0.04 0.12 -0.31 -0.06 0.05 -0.06 -0.10 -0.013 -0.13
T-stat 0.64 -0.97 1.07 -1.81 -0.49 0.25 -1.55 -3.10 -0.25 -1.57
Std 0.51 0.47 1.34 1.93 1.87 2.07 0.59 0.35 0.83 0.90
Skewness -0.73 -0.64 0.76 -0.42 1.50 -2.69 -0.84 0.06 1.27 -0.90
Kurtosis 8.17 6.16 11.0 4.42 19.8 16.7 10.9 11.2 13.3 5.63
Min -2.48 -2.09 -5.46 -7.91 -7.50 -12.8 -2.70 -1.40 -3.57 -4.18
Max 1.70 1.15 6.39 4.66 12.1 4.17 3.34 1.73 5.13 1.80
Sharpe Ratio 0.04 -0.09 0.09 -0.16 -0.03 0.02 -0.10 -0.28 -0.02 -0.14
# of obs 240 123 145 123 240 123 240 123 240 123
Strategy 2
Mean 0.003 -0.07 0.032 -0.10 -0.004 0.03 -0.035 -0.04 0.006 -0.06
T-stat 0.11 -2.26 0.37 -0.76 -0.05 0.25 -1.32 -2.15 0.15 -0.91
Std 0.39 0.35 1.04 1.52 1.36 1.54 0.41 0.20 0.62 0.71
Skewness -1.24 -1.04 0.36 -0.26 2.38 -2.14 1.24 2.03 1.94 -0.83
Kurtosis 12.4 9.34 12.2 5.21 24.0 16.1 14.6 19.0 16.6 6.47
Min -2.54 -1.85 -2.44 -5.97 -5.74 -8.64 -1.94 -0.74 -2.57 -3.10
Max 1.44 1.29 5.32 5.14 9.04 5.77 2.69 1.28 4.32 2.17
Sharpe Ratio 0.01 -0.20 0.03 -0.07 -0.003 0.02 -0.09 -0.19 0.01 -0.08
# of obs 240 123 145 123 240 123 240 123 240 123
Table 4.4: Summary Statistics of Monthly Excess Returns with Two Strategies using Out-of-Index Commodities
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To further confirm the results, I perform a panel regression which is specified as follows




inIndex + Controls+ ui,t. (7)
where the dependent variable Reti,t is Strategy’s average excess return in the trading period
of commodity i in year t and ui,t is the random error. I
i
IndexCom is an indicator variable,
which is equal to 1 if commodity i is an index commodity and 0 if it is an out-of-index
commodity. Ii,tinIndex is also an indicate variable, which is equal to 1 if commodity i is
actually included in the SP-GSCI in year t and 0 if otherwise. Since the SP-GSCI was
launched at the end of 1991, Ii,tinIndex = 0 for all index commodities before 1992. Among the
19 index commodities, natural gas was added to the SP-GSCI in 1994. Crude oil (Brent),
gasoil and Kansas wheat were included into the SP-GSCI in 1999, and feeder cattle was
included in 2002. All other 14 commodities were added before 1992.
To control for the macroeconomic demand-and-supply conditions and business cycle,
the contemporaneous GDP growth and inflation in year t are included in the regressions.
I also include a control variable that is specific to each commodity in each year. This
variable is the average roll yield of commodity i in year t. This control variable summarizes
the commodity-specific demand-and-supply condition and the term structure feature. All
control variables are demeaned.
The coefficients of interests are α, β1 and β2. α is the average of Ret
i,t for out-of-index
commodities. For index commodities, α + β1 is the average of Ret
i,t before they were
included in the SP-GSCI (or the launch of the SP-GSCI), while α+ β1 + β2 is the average
of Reti,t after the inclusions. The expected values of α and β1 are: α = 0 and β1 = 0, which
means that without index investment, the strategy’s excess return is 0. If the Goldman roll
had price impact, we should expect β2 > 0. As reported in Column 1 and 3 of 4.5, the
coefficients α and β1 are not statistically different from 0 for both strategies. After inclusion
in the SP-GSCI, Strategy 1 yielded an average excess return of 0.35% in the trading period
of 10 days, while Strategy 2 has an average excess return of 0.24% in the 5-day trading
period. Both are statistically significant at the 1% level. Column 2 and 4 of 4.5 indicates
that the results are robust if we only consider index commodities (IiIndexCom = 1).
For the control variables, GDP growth and inflation were both positively correlated
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Dependent variable: Reti,t
Strategy 1 Strategy 2
All IiIndexCom = 1 All I
i
IndexCom = 1
1 2 3 4
Constant −0.028 0.011 −0.026 −0.030




∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.060) (0.036) (0.034)
Controls
RY i,t −0.031 −0.022 −0.008 0.002
(0.019) (0.016) (0.011) (0.012)
growthtGDP 0.034
∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.013) (0.007) (0.009)
Inflationt 0.032∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.005
(0.008) (0.009) (0.006) (0.010)
R2adj 8.89% 10.25% 7.82% 10.72%
obs 956 537 956 537
Table 4.5: Regressions on the Trading Strategies’ Excess Returns 1
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with the dependent variable and statistically significant. The commodity-specific control
variable–average roll yield of commodity i in year t–is insignificant, which means that the
strategies’ excess returns are not related the slope of the terms structure.
In sum, the results above indicate that the price impact of the Goldman roll is both
statistically and economically significant. The Goldman roll effectively created a large
market anomaly and a great trading opportunity for arbitragers.
4.3 Limits to Arbitrage
All information about the Goldman roll is publicly available. Compared to equity and
bond markets, futures markets have much fewer barriers for arbitrage. There is no short-
sell constraints, and high leverage can be easily obtained through low margin requirement.
The transaction cost is also very low, and the trading strategies are very easy to imple-
ment. Therefore, if the market is well arbitraged, we should not expect to see such great
performance of front-running the Goldman roll as any market anomaly would be quickly
arbitraged away. The fact that the strategies worked so well in the last decade suggests that
there are some limits to arbitrage. The performance of front-running is largely determined
by two opposite forces. The positive one is the size of index investment, while the negative
one is the size of arbitrage capital utilized to take advantage of the price impact.
From 1986, the CFTC started to publish weekly Commitment of Traders (COT) reports,
which includes the aggregate number of spread positions taken by ”Noncommercial” traders.
These traders are mainly money managers and labeled speculators in the literature. Since
to capture the price impact, the arbitrageurs have to create spread positions, the number of
spread positions held by speculators serves as a good approximation, although the nature
of these spread positions can not be identified.
4.5 shows each year the average spread positions taken by speculators and also their
ratios relative to total open interests in the markets of 9 index commodities7. For most
commodities, there was very few spread positions and also little growth until 2003, espe-
7Due to limit of space and the large number of commodities, I only report these 9 commodities. The
plots for other 8 commodities have similar pattern, and are available upon request.















































































































































































Figure 4.5: Average Number of Spread Position Taken by Speculators
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cially in energy and livestock sectors, which front-running strategies yielded the best per-
formances. However, the positions started to growth dramatically from 2003 and reached
peaks in 2008 for many commodities. The growth was typically more than 5-fold. The plots
suggest that very few arbitrage capital was used to exploit the price impact before 2003,
and then as the arbitrageurs became more aware of this trading opportunity, more capital is
utilized to exploit this market anomaly. This is consistent with the theory of Duffie (2010)
that arbitrage capital can be slow-moving due to arbitrageurs’ inattention to a particular
market and particular strategy. Before 2003, commodity was not a popular asset class and
commodity index investment was rarely known among the investment communities.
As shown in 4.4, the 4 sector portfolios enjoyed the best gains in the period 2003-2005,
when commodity index investment started the most dramatic growth and there were not
many arbitrageurs. During three years, the average of unlevered annual excess return was
8.09% for the energy portfolio, 7.18% for the livestock portfolio, 5.62% for the agriculture
portfolio and 0.28% for the metals portfolio. However, the performance of the 4 portfolios
has been declining since 2006, and the average excess returns dropped to levels close to 0.
The livestock portfolio even experienced negative average excess returns since 2008.
Part of the reason is the increasing arbitrage capital, but another cause is that many
investors might have moved their assets away from these commodity index investments.
When the commodity prices collapsed in the middle of 2008, commodity index investment
reduced a lot. The data from CFTC’s supplement reports shows that the total long posi-
tions held by index investors dropped 30-50% from their peaks for many agriculture and
livestock commodities in 2008. During this period, many portfolios also experienced their
maximum drawdowns. Also, a new generation of commodity indices emerged since 2006
with more intelligent rolling methodologies. Many investments moved from the old gen-
eration of indices to the new generation. Instead of just focusing on contracts with short
maturities, new commodity indices search the full term structure, and choose maturities as
far as one year ahead. The exact maturity choice usually depends on the term structure of
the current market. If the term structure is in contango, they roll into contracts with long
maturities to reduce the frequency of rolling and thus the roll cost. If the term structure
is in backwardation, they roll into the contracts with close maturities to take advantage of
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the positive roll yields.
This is consistent with the classic limits to arbitrage theory by Shleifer and Vishny
(1997). The arbitrage profit is lower when there is a reduction in size of index investment
and an increase in the amount of arbitrage capital in the futures markets. The performance
of front-running the Goldman roll is determined by the net result of two opposite forces.
To confirm this correlation, I run the following panel regressions for index commodities:




inIndex ×NetRatioi,t + Controls+ ui,t. (8)
where the dependent variable Reti,t is Strategy’s average excess return in the trading period
of commodity i in year t and Ii,tinIndex is the indicator variable specified in the last section,
which is equal to 1 if commodity i is actually included in the SP-GSCI in year t and 0 if
otherwise. NetRatioi,t = IndexRatioi,t − SpreadRatioi,t measures net result of the two
forces, where IndexRatioi,t is the average ratio of index investment in commodity i relative
to the value of its total open interest and SpreadRatioi,t is the average ratio of spread
position held by speculators relative to total open interest.
The data on investment tied to the SP-GSCI and DJ-UBSCI are not publicly available.
Master and White (2008) use sources of Bloomberg, Goldman Sachs and CFTC reports
to construct an annual series of estimated investment tied to the two indices from 1991 to
2008 (first half year). In addition, they estimate that the SP-GSCI had about 63% market
share and the DJ-UBSCI had about 32% market share in 2008. Another important data
source is the quarterly CFTC reports of index investments starting from the fourth quarter
of 2007, which have data on the values of total index investment. I only consider the value
of long positions in the CFTC’s reports, and the quarterly data is converted into annual
data by using the average of four quarters in one calendar year. Using the estimated market
shares, I construct the values of investment tied to the SP-GSCI and DJ-UBSCI in 2008
and 2009. For each index, total value of investment tied to it is then allocated to individual
commodity according to its weighting scheme each year, and for individual commodity, the
total value of index investment is equal to sum of investment from the two indices. The
variable IndexRatioi,t is equal to the value of index investment in commodity i in year t
divided by the commodity’s total market value in year t, which is average value of total
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open interests in year t. The data on total open interests and spread positions held by
noncommercial traders can be obtained from the CFTC’s COT reports.
As reported in Column 1 and 3 of 4.6, the coefficient β3 is statistically positive for both
strategies, especially for Strategy 1, whose average excess return increases by 0.96 bps with
1% increase in the net ratio. Column 2 and 4 of 4.6 shows that the results are robust if we
only consider index commodities after they were included in the SP-GSCI.
To conclude, the exercise provides empirical evidence that a market anomaly can exist
and persist due to slow-moving arbitrage capital and the resulting delayed arbitrage. As
more people become aware of the price impact, more arbitragers will exploit it and index
investors will also move their investments into better designed commodity indices.
4.4 Cost of the Price Impact
It has been very profitable to exploit the price impact of the Goldman roll, but from the
perspective of index investors, how costly was the price impact? In this section, I will
estimate the cost of the price impact by comparing two excess return indices. Since the
SP-GSCI was launched at the end of 1991, I consider the period starting from 1992 for the
estimation.
On January 2 1992, $100 dollars were assumed to be invested in futures contracts of
the 19 index commodities. The investment that each commodity receives from the $100
is proportional to its SP-GSCI weight in 2010. To focus on the cost of the price impact,
there is no re-balancing and the choice of futures contracts to hold is exactly the same as
the SP-GSCI. I construct two indices with different rolling periods. One index rolls the
futures forward in the SP-GSCI’s rolling period, and is labeled ”SP-GSCI Roll” index, so
this index rolls exactly the same as the Goldman roll. The other index rolls just 10 business
days earlier, in the first 5 days of the 15-day rolling window we discussed previously, and
is labeled ”Earlier Roll” index. The interest earned on collateral is not considered, so the
indices are excess return indices.
As shown in Panel A of 4.6, the values of the two indices closely tracked each other before
2000, and then started to deviate far away. Although the two indices still shared the same
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Dependent variable: Reti,t
Strategy 1 Strategy 2
IiIndexCom = 1 I
i,t
inIndex = 1 I
i
IndexCom = 1 I
i,t
inIndex = 1
1 2 3 4
Constant 0.062∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ −0.013 0.15∗∗∗





∗∗∗ 1.04∗∗∗ 0.33∗ 0.39∗∗
(0.25) (0.24) (0.17) (0.17)
Controls
RY i,t 0.002 0.002 0.021 0.027
(0.019) (0.025) (0.013) (0.018)
growthtGDP 0.064
∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.024) (0.010) (0.013)
Inflationt 0.012 −0.009 0.002 −0.007
(0.022) (0.049) (0.019) (0.041)
R2adj 12.16% 9.26% 11.12% 8.40%
obs 404 287 404 287
Table 4.6: Regressions on the Trading Strategys’ Excess Returns 2
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pattern in the period 2000-2010 due to the same exposure to the spot returns, the ”Earlier
Roll” index outperformed the ”SP-GSCI Roll” index because its roll yields were higher.
When commodity prices reached heights in mid-2008, the ”SP-GSCI Roll” index reached
a peak value $725, while the ”Earlier Roll” index reached $1099, with out-performance of
$374.

































Figure 4.6: Value of Two Indices with Different Rolling Dates
As a comparison, I also picked from the control group 12 out-of-index commodities
that have data back to 1992 and until 2009. Since there are no reference weights, equal
weighting is applied to each commodity. The same two rolling rules are applied to form the
same two indices: ”SP-GSCI Roll” and ”Earlier Roll”. As shown in Panel B of 4.6, there
is no detectable difference between the values of two indices in the whole period 1992-2009.
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The maximum difference between the two indices was only about $6.
4.7 reports the summary statistics of the two indices’ annualized excess returns. The
full period is divided into two sub-periods: 1992-1999 and 2000-20098. For the 19 index
commodities, the excess returns of the two indices had almost the same standard deviations
and skewness in both periods, but the means are quite different. The ”SP-GSCI Roll”
index yielded an annual excess return of 2.31% before 2000 and 7.93% since 2000, while the
”Earlier Roll” index outperformed it annually by 1.66% and 3.59% respectively. Therefore,
the Sharpe ratio of the ”Earlier Roll” index was 82% higher in the period 1992-1999 and 48%
higher in the period 2000-2009. In addition, the difference in excess returns had a positive
skewness 0.43 before 2000, and 0.79 from 2000, which indicates the arbitrage opportunity
induced by the price impact. It is also statistically significant that the mean difference
in excess returns in the period 2000-2009 is larger than the mean difference in the period
1992-1999, which suggests that when index investment grew larger, index investors endured
a higher cost of the price impact.
In a clear contrast, for the 12 out-of-index commodities, all the summary statistics of
the two indices are roughly the same in both periods. Although the ”Earlier Roll” index
was still slightly better, the out-performance was very small, only about 0.25%, and the
difference of excess returns were not always positively skewed.
In order to estimate the cost of the price impact in absolute amount, I collect the data on
total commodity index investment from Masters and White (2008) and the CFTC’s reports
of index investment. All investments are assumed to be tied to the ”SP-GSCI Roll” index.
Each year, the cost due to the price impact is estimated by the size of index investment
multiplied by the average difference of excess returns between the ”SP-GSCI Roll” index
and ”Earlier Roll” index in this year. As shown in 4.7, as the index investment grew, the
cost also grew fast. From 2004, investing in the ”SP-GSCI Roll” index lost over $2 billion
every year to the ”Earlier Roll” index, and in 2009, the loss reached a maximum of $8.4
billion.
8The returns in 2010 are excluded because the propane data ends in Sep 2009 and I want to include one
energy commodity in the group of out-of-index commodities. However, the results are very similar if data
of 2010 is included and propane is excluded.
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1992-1999 2000-2009
SP-GSCI Roll Earlier Roll Diff. SP-GSCI Roll Earlier Roll Diff. DID
19 Index Commodities
Mean 2.31% 3.97% 1.66% 7.93% 11.52% 3.59% 1.93%∗∗
Sd 21.5% 20.3% 2.20% 34.4% 34.1% 2.36%
Skewness 0.02 0.05 0.43 −0.3 −0.3 0.79
Sharpe Ratio 0.11 0.20 0.23 0.34
12 Out-of-Index Commodities
Mean 4.67% 4.90% 0.23% 5.61% 5.87% 0.26% 0.03%
Sd 11.4% 11.4% 1.14% 20.1% 20.2% 1.02%
Skewness 0.008 −0.001 2.19 −0.2 −0.2 −0.31
Sharpe Ratio 0.41 0.43 0.28 0.29
Table 4.7: Summary Statistics of Two Indices with Different Rolling Periods
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Figure 4.7: Estimated Size of Index Investment and Loss due to Price Impact
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In sum, because the massive shorting and longing of futures contracts exerts very high
price pressure in the rolling period, the resulting price impact has been very costly to index
investors in terms of both forgone excess return and absolute amount of loss.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
Since index funds have very low management fees, investors usually perceive index invest-
ment as an inexpensive way to gain broad market exposure. While it seems to be true for
the equity index funds, this paper shows that index investment can be very expensive in
the commodity markets due to the large price impact of index investors’ mechanical rolling
forward of futures contracts. Equity index funds invest directly in the underlying assets, so
the fund managers rarely need to change positions besides the inflow and outflow of new
funds. While there are some documented inefficiencies in equity investment, like the inclu-
sion effect, the resulted costs are quite small, because the inefficiencies only happen at very
low frequency and arbitrageurs in the equity markets are very competitive. Commodity in-
dex investment is very different, because investors take long positions in commodity futures
contracts. Since futures contracts have expiration dates, commodity index investors have to
roll their entire positions forward at monthly frequency, which resulted a very high cost due
to the large price impact of this rolling activity. Commodity index investors lost on average
3.6% annual excess returns due to the price impact. In absolute terms, the estimated loss
amounted to a total of $26 billion over the period 2000 to 2009, while the estimated total
management fee was only about $5 billion. This magnitude of economic loss dwarfs the
cost of price impact in the S&P 500 equity index due to the inclusion and exclusion effect,
which was about 0.21-0.28% each year on average from 1990 to 2005 estimated by Petajisto
(2010). In absolute terms, Petajisto assumed total assets of $1.2 trillion tied to the S&P
500, and the estimated annual average costs were $2.5-3.4 billion.
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Concern about price impact motivated some second-generation commodity indices to
have longer rolling periods so that the price pressure on each rolling date is very small.
One example is the UBS Constant Maturity Commodity Index (CMCI), which roll futures
forward at daily frequency. However, it seems that many other new indices still did not
recognize the possible price impact, because they still have very short rolling periods, and the
new rolling methodologies are mainly designed to reduce the roll cost in the current contango
markets. As discussed, these indices tend to roll into contracts with long maturities, but
these contracts are not as liquid as the contracts with short maturities, so the price impact
of the rolling activity could be quite large even though the investment tied to these indices
is not very large. As these indices get more popular, the price impact and the resulted cost
can be even larger.
This extends to a more general question of security design. Commodity indices are
very different from the traditional securities, because investing in them requires continuous
management due to the special rolling requirement. Therefore, the designer has to think
about the possible negative effects of fixed management actions when the assets under
management grow larger, and whether the designed index will be immune to these effects.
Another problem is that as the designer tries to minimize the potential negative effects,
the management rules could become very complicated. Since the complexity of the index
increases, the cost of replicating it and thus the management fee increases, and investors
may feel that it is more difficult to understand and analyze the index. There is a balance
between the potential benefits and costs associated with the complexity of securities. These
problems also apply to the design of exchange-traded funds (ETFs), which are becoming
more and more popular among investors.
Although the market anomaly created by the Goldman roll can be arbitraged away by
enough arbitrageurs, the impact of index investment will not disappear. As more and more
arbitrageurs try to front-run the Goldman roll and also each other, they can spread the price
impact out to other dates and also other maturities. This can have a profound effect on the
term structure of commodity futures markets, and may potentially be one of the reasons why
the term structures of many index commodities have moved from backwardation towards
contango in recent years. Further research can investigate this hypothesis and look at the
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impact of index investment on commodity term structure.
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Chapter 6
Abstract
This paper studies the asset pricing implications of Bayesian learning about the parame-
ters, states, and models determining aggregate consumption dynamics. Our approach is
empirical and focuses on the quantitative implications of learning in real-time using post
World War II consumption data. We characterize this learning process and find that re-
visions in beliefs stemming from parameter and model uncertainty are significantly related
to realized aggregate equity returns. This evidence is novel, providing strong support for a
learning-based story. Further, we show that beliefs regarding the conditional moments of
consumption growth are strongly time-varying and exhibit business cycle and/or long-run
fluctuations. Much of the long-run behavior is unanticipated ex ante. We embed these
subjective beliefs in a general equilibrium model to investigate further asset pricing impli-
cations. We find that learning significantly improves the model’s ability to fit standard
asset pricing moments, relative to benchmark model with fixed parameters. This provides
additional evidence supporting the importance of learning.
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Chapter 7
Introduction
This paper studies the asset pricing implications of learning about aggregate consumption
dynamics. We are motivated by practical difficulties generated from the use of complicated
consumption-based asset pricing models with many difficult-to-estimate parameters and
latent states. For example, parameters or states controlling long-run consumption growth
are at once extremely important for asset pricing and particularly difficult to estimate.
Thus, we are interested in studying an economic agent who is burdened with some of the
same econometric problems faced by researchers, a problem suggested by Hansen (2007).1
A large existing literature studies asset pricing implications of statistical learning –
the process of updating beliefs about uncertain parameters, state variables, or even model
specifications. Pastor and Veronesi (2009) provide a recent survey. In theory, learning
can generate a wide range of implications relating to stock valuation, levels and variation
in expected returns and volatility, and time series predictability, with many of the results
focussed on the implications of learning about dividend dynamics.
Our analysis differs from existing work along three key dimensions. First, we focus
1Hansen (2007) states: “In actual decision making, we may be required to learn about moving targets, to
make parametric inferences, to compare model performance, or to gauge the importance of long-run compo-
nents of uncertainty. As the statistical problem that agents confront in our model is made complex, rational
expectations’ presumed confidence in their knowledge of the probability specification becomes more tenuous.
This leads me to ask: (a) how can we burden the investors with some of the specification problems that
challenge the econometrician, and (b) when would doing so have important quantitative implications” (p.2).
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on the empirical implications of simultaneously learning about parameters, state variables,
and even model specifications. Most existing work focuses on learning a single parameter or
state variable. Learning about multiple unknowns is more difficult as additional unknowns
often confounds inference, slowing the learning process. Second, we focus on the specific
implications of real-time learning about consumption dynamics from macroeconomic data
during the U.S. post World War II experience. Thus, we are not expressly interested in
general asset pricing implications of learning in repeated sampling settings, but rather
the specific implications generated by the historical macroeconomic shocks realized in the
United States over the last 65 years. Third, we use a new and stringent test of learning
that relates updates in investor beliefs to contemporaneous, realized equity returns.
In studying the implications of learning, we focus on the following types of questions.
Could an agent who updates his beliefs rationally detect non-i.i.d. consumption growth
dynamics in real time? How rapidly does the agent learn about parameters and models?
Are the revisions in beliefs about consumption moments correlated with asset returns, as a
learning story would require? Is there evidence that learning effects can help us understand
standard asset pricing puzzles, such as the high equity premium, return volatility, and
degree of return predictability?
One of the key implications of learning is that the agent’s beliefs are nonstationary. For
example, the agent may gradually learn that one model fits the data better than an alter-
native model or that a parameter value is higher or lower than previously thought, both of
which generate nonstationarity in beliefs. The easiest way to see this is to note that the
posterior mean of a parameter, E
[
θ|yt], where yt is data up to time t, is trivially a mar-
tingale. Thus revisions in beliefs represent permanent, nonstationary shocks, that can have
important asset pricing implications. For instance, nonstationary dynamics can generate
a quantitatively important wedge between ex post outcomes and ex ante beliefs, providing
an alternative explanation for standard asset pricing quantities such as the observed equity
premium or excess return predictability.2
We study learning in the context of three standard Markov switching models of con-
sumption growth: unrestricted 2- and 3-state models and a restricted 2-state model that
2See also Cogley and Sargent (2008), Timmermann (1993), and Lewellen and Shanken (2002).
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generates i.i.d. consumption growth. The states capture business cycle fluctuations and can
be labeled as expansion and recession in 2-state models, with an additional ‘disaster’ state
in 3-state models.3 Our key assumption is that the agent views the parameters, states, and
even models as unknowns, using Bayes rule to update beliefs using consumption data, as
well as additional macroeconomic data such as GDP growth in extensions.
To focus on different aspects of learning, we consider three sets of initial parameter
beliefs. The first, the ‘historical prior,’ trains the prior using Shiller’s consumption data
from 1889 until 1946, a common approach to generate ‘objective’ priors.4 The second, the
‘look-ahead prior,’ sets prior parameter means to full-sample maximum likelihood point
estimates using post World War II data. We embed substantial uncertainty around these
estimates to study the effect of parameter uncertainty. This is often called an ‘empirical
Bayes’ approach. The third, the fixed parameter prior, is a rational expectations benchmark
with dogmatic beliefs that are fixed at the end-of-sample parameter estimates. Thus, there
is no parameter uncertainty. There is state uncertainty, however, which allows us to separate
the effects of parameter and state uncertainty.
Our first results characterize the beliefs about parameters, states, models, and future
consumption dynamics (e.g., moments) through the sample. The perceived dynamic behav-
ior of aggregate consumption is at the heart of consumption-based asset pricing as it, jointly
with preferences, determines the dynamic properties of the pricing kernel. In terms of be-
liefs, we compute at each point in time the posterior distribution of parameters, states, and
models. As new data arrives, we update beliefs using Bayes rule. In addition to usual sum-
3Markov switching models for consumption or dividends are a benchmark specification in the literature,
see, e.g., Mehra and Prescott (1985), Rietz (1988), Cecchetti, Lam, and Mark (1990, 1993), Whitelaw
(2000), Cagetti, Hansen, Sargent, and Williams (2002), Barro (2006), Barro and Ursua (2008), Chen (2008),
Bhamra, Kuehn, and Strebulaev (2008), Barro, Nakamura, Steinsson and Ursua (2009), Backus, Chernov,
and Martin (2009), and Gabaix (2009). Rietz (1988) and, more recently, Barro (2006, 2009) argue that
consumption disaster risk can help explain some of the standard macro-finance asset pricing puzzles.
4We do account for measurement error, which likely increased reported macroeconomic volatility during
the pre-war period, as argued in Romer (1989). Malmendier and Nagel (2011) present evidence that the
experience of the Great Depression affected investors’ subsequent beliefs about risk and return, broadly
consistent with the Historical prior calibration approach.
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maries of parameters and states, we also compute model probabilities and perform ‘model
monitoring’ in real time as new data arrives. We find that the posterior probability of the
i.i.d. model falls dramatically over time, provided the prior weight is less than one. Thus our
agent is able to learn in real-time that consumption growth is not i.i.d., but has persistent
components.5 The agent believes that expected consumption growth is low in recessions
and high in expansions, with the opposite pattern for consumption growth volatility. The
2-state model quickly emerges as the most likely, but the 3-state model with a disaster state
has 5 − 10% probability at the end of the sample. At the onset of the financial crisis in
2008, the probability of the disaster model increases.6
There is significant learning about the expansion state parameters, slower learning about
the recession state, and almost no learning about the disaster state, as it is rarely, if ever,
visited. Thus, there is an observed differential in the speed of learning. Standard large
sample theory implies that all parameters converge at the same rate, but the realized con-
vergence rate depends on the actual observed sample path. There is also strong evidence
for nonstationary time-variation in the conditional means and variances of consumption
growth, as well as measures of non-normality such as skewness and kurtosis. For both the
historical and the look-ahead priors, the agent’s perception of the long-run mean (volatil-
ity) of consumption growth generally increases (decreases) over the sample. The perceived
persistence of recessions (expansions) decreases (increases).7 As the agent’s beliefs about
these parameters and moments change, asset prices and risk premia will also change.
The first formal test of the importance of learning regresses contemporaneous excess
stock market returns on revisions in beliefs about expected consumption growth. This
test, which to our knowledge is new to the literature, is a fundamental implication of
any learning-based explanation: for learning to matter, unexpected revisions in beliefs
5This result is robust to persistence induced by time-aggregation of the consumption data (see Working
(1960)).
6The posterior probability of the three-state model would change dramatically, if visited. For example, if
a -3% quarterly consumption growth shock were realized at the end of the sample, the posterior probability
of the three-state model would increase to almost 50%.
7All of the results described in the current and previous paragraphs are robust to learning from additional
GDP growth data.
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about expected consumption growth should be reflected in the unexpected aggregate equity
returns.8. We find strong statistical evidence that this relationship is positive, and the
results are similar for both the historical and the look-ahead prior. To disentangle parameter
from state learning, we include revisions in beliefs generated by the fixed parameter prior
as a control. Revisions in beliefs obtained using the historical and look-ahead priors remain
statistically significant, but revisions in beliefs generated by models with known parameters
are statistically insignificant.
These results imply that learning about parameters and models is a statistically sig-
nificant determinant of asset returns in our sample, confirming our main hypothesis. This
result is strengthened if the agent learns from both consumption and GDP growth. It is
important to note that our agent only learns in real-time and from macroeconomic fun-
damentals, as no asset price data (such as the dividend-price ratio) is used when forming
beliefs. Since the revisions in beliefs obtained from the models with fixed parameters are
statistically insignificant, the evidence questions the standard full-information, rational ex-
pectations implementation of the standard consumption-based model, at least for the models
of consumption dynamics that we consider.9
As mentioned earlier, parameter and model learning generate nonstationary dynamics
and permanent shocks that could have important implications. To investigate these im-
plications, we consider a formal asset pricing exercise assuming Epstein-Zin preferences.
Because the specific time-path of beliefs is important, the usual calibration and simulation
approach used in the literature is not applicable, and we consider the following alternative
pricing procedure. At time t, given beliefs over parameters, models, and states, our agent
prices a levered claim to a future consumption stream, computing quantities such as ex-
8The sign of the effect would in a model depend on the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, and also
on the other moments that change at the same time (volatility, skewness, kurtosis, etc.). In the model
section, we show that this positive relation is consistent with a model with an elasticity of intertemporal
substitution greater than 1.
9Parameter and model learning, on the one hand, and state learning on the other hand are distinct in
our setting because the former generates a non-stationary path of beliefs, while the latter, after an initial
burn-in period, is stationary.
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ante expected returns and dividend-price ratios.10 Then, at time t + 1, our agent updates
beliefs using new macro realizations at time t+ 1, recomputes prices, expected returns and
dividend-price ratios. From this time series of prices, we compute realized equity returns,
volatilities, etc. Thus, we feed historically realized macroeconomic data into the model
and analyze the asset pricing implications for various models and prior specifications. This
process is required when the time path matters and was previously used in, for example,
Campbell and Cochrane (1999), where habit is a function of past consumption growth. We
use standard preference parameters taken from Bansal and Yaron (2004).
Solving the full pricing problem with priced parameter uncertainty is computationally
prohibitive, as the dimensionality of the problem is too large.11 To price assets in a tractable
way, while still incorporating learning, we follow Piazzesi and Schneider (2010) and Cogley
and Sargent (2009) and use a version of Kreps’ (1994) anticipated utility. This implies
that our agent prices claims at each point in time using current posterior means for the
parameters and model probabilities, assuming those values will persist into the indefinite
future. We do account for state uncertainty when pricing.
This pricing experiment provides additional evidence, along multiple dimensions, for
the importance of learning. Focussing on the 3-state model, we first note that the model
with parameters fixed at the full-sample values has a difficult time with standard asset
pricing moments: the realized equity premium and Sharpe ratio are less than half the values
observed in the data. The volatility of the price-dividend ratio is eighty percent less than
the observed value. Parameter learning uniformly improves all of these statistics, bringing
them close to observed values. The results are, after a burn-in period, similar for the look-
ahead and the historical prior as the agent quickly unlearns the mean parameter beliefs of
the look-ahead prior early in the sample. It is important to note that this is not a calibration
10We do price a levered consumption claim and introduce idiosyncratic noise to break the perfect rela-
tionship between consumption and dividend growth. The dividends are calibrated to match the volatility of
dividend growth and the correlation between dividend and consumption growth.
11As an example, for the 3-state model there are twelve parameters, each with two hyperparameters
characterizing the posteriors. This implies that we would have to have to solve numerically for prices on
a very high dimensional grid, which is infeasible. There are additional difficult technical issues associated
with priced parameter uncertainty, as noted by Geweke (2001) and Weitzman (2007).
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exercise – we did not choose the structural parameters to generate these returns.
The increase in the realized equity premium and return volatility is due to unexpected
revisions in beliefs resulting from the parameter and model learning. In particular, the
average annualized ex ante quarterly risk premium is similar across the models at about
1.7%, but the models with uncertain parameters generate a higher realized equity premium
of about 3.8% to 4.2%, close to the 4.7% observed over the sample. This documents a
dramatic impact of the specific time path of beliefs about parameters and models for stan-
dard asset pricing statistics, at least relative to the fixed parameter, rational expectations
benchmark. This also implies, looking forward, that the perceived equity premium is much
smaller than the realized equity premium over the post World War II period. These points
are consistent with the results in Cogley and Sargent (2008).12
In terms of predictability, the returns generated by learning over time closely match the
data. For the historical and look-ahead priors and for forecasting excess market returns
with the lagged log dividend-price ratio, the generated regression coefficients and R2’s are
increasing with the forecasting horizon and similar to those found in the data. The fixed
parameters case, however, does not deliver significant ex post predictability, although the ex
ante risk premium is in fact time-varying in these models as well because the risk premium
time-variation assuming fixed parameters is too small relative to the volatility of realized
returns to result in significant t-statistics. The intuition for why in-sample predictability
occurs when agents are uncertain about parameters and models is the same as in Tim-
mermann (1993) and Lewellen and Shanken (2002) – unexpected updates in growth and
discount rates impact the dividend-price ratio and returns in opposite directions leading to
the observed positive in-sample relation. Thus, in-sample predictability can be expected
with parameter and model learning. The quantitatively large degree of in-sample relative
12Cogley and Sargent (2008) assume negatively biased beliefs about the consumption dynamics to highlight
the same mechanism and also consider the role of robustness. In their model, the subjective probability of
recessions is higher than the ’objective’ estimate from the data. The results we present here are consistent
with their conclusions, but our models are estimated from fundamentals in real-time, which allows for an
out-of-sample examination of the time-series of revisions in beliefs. Further, we allow for learning over
different models of the data generating process, as well as all the parameters of each model.
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to out-of-sample predictability we find is consistent with the literature.13
We also note that the model exhibits volatile long maturity risk-free yields, consistent
with the data. Learning about fixed quantities such as models or parameters generate
permanent shocks that affect agents’ expectations of the long-run (infinite-horizon) distri-
bution of consumption growth. This is different from existing asset pricing models where
only stationary variables affect marginal utility growth (see, e.g., Bansal and Yaron (2004),
and Wachter’s (2005) extension of Campbell and Cochrane (1999) model, as well as our
fixed parameters benchmark model). In these models, long-run (infinite-horizon) risk-free
yields are constant as the transitory shocks to marginal utility growth die out in the long
run. This is additional evidence supporting a learning-based explanation relative to the
fixed parameters alternative.
In conclusion, our results strongly support the importance of parameter and model
learning for understanding the joint behavior of consumption and asset prices in the U.S.
post World War II sample. First, parameter and model learning leads to a time path
of belief revisions that are correlated with realized equity returns, controlling for realized
consumption growth. Second, the time series of beliefs help explain the time-series of the
price level of the market (the time-series of the price-dividend ratio) in a general equilibrium
model. Third, beliefs display strong nonstationarity over time, driving a wedge between ex
ante beliefs and ex post realizations that is absent in rational expectations models. Fourth,
permanent shocks to beliefs generate permanent shocks to marginal utility growth. These
features help explain common asset pricing puzzles such as excess return volatility, the
high sample equity premium, the high degree of in-sample return predictability, and the
high volatility of long-run yields, all relative to a fixed parameter alternative. The results
are generated by real-time learning from consumption (and GDP growth), using standard
preference parameters without directly calibrating to asset returns. In this sense the results
are entirely “out-of-sample.”
13For example, Fama and French (1988) document a high degree of in-sample predictability of excess
(long-horizon) stock market returns using the price-dividend ratio as the predictive variable. On the other
hand, Goyal and Welch (2008) and Ang and Bekaert (2007) document poor out-of-sample performance of
these regressions in the data, and the historical and look-ahead prior learning models presented here are
consistent with this evidence.




We follow a large literature and assume an exogenous Markov or regime switching process
for aggregate, real, per capita consumption growth dynamics. Log consumption growth,
∆ct, evolves via:
∆ct = µst + σstεt, (8.1)







are the Markov state-dependent mean and variance of consumption
growth. The Markov chain evolves via a N ×N transition matrix Π with elements piij such
that Prob[st = j|st−1 = i] = piij , with the restriction that Nj=1piij = 1. The fixed parameters








as the elements of the transition matrix. The transition matrix controls the persistence of
the Markov state.
Markov switching models are flexible and tractable and have been widely used since
Mehra and Prescott (1985) and Rietz (1988). By varying the number, persistence, and
distribution of the states, the model can generate a wide range of economically interesting
and statistically flexible distributions. Although the εt’s are i.i.d. normal and the distribu-
tion of consumption growth, conditional on st and parameters, is normally distributed, the
distribution of future consumption growth is neither i.i.d. nor normal due to the shifting
Markov state. This time-variation induces very flexible marginal and predictive distribu-
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tions for consumption growth. These models are also tractable, as it is possible to compute
likelihood functions and filtering distributions, given parameters.
We consider two and three state models and also consider a restricted version of the
two state model generating i.i.d consumption growth by imposing the restriction pi11 = pi21
and pi22 = pi12 = 1− pi11. Under this assumption, consumption growth is an i.i.d. mixture
of two normal distributions, essentially a discrete-time version of Merton’s (1976) mixture
model. The general two and 3-state models have 6 and 12 parameters, respectively. The
i.i.d. two state model has 5 parameters (µ1, µ2, σ1, σ2 and pi11).
It is common in these models to provide business cycle labels to the states. In a 2-state
model, we interpret the two states as ‘recession’ and ‘expansion,’ while the three state model
additionally allows for a ‘disaster’ state.1 Although rare event models have been used for
understanding equity valuation since Rietz (1988), there has been a recent resurgence in
research using these models (see, e.g., Barro (2006, 2009), Barro and Ursua (2008), Barro,
Nakamura, Steinsson and Ursua (2009), Backus, Chernov, and Martin (2009), and Gabaix
(2009)).
8.2 Information and learning
To operationalize the model, additional assumptions are required regarding the economic
agent’s information set. Since we want to model learning similar to that faced by the
econometrician, we assume agents observe aggregate consumption growth, but are uncertain
about the Markov state, the parameters, and the total number of Markov states. We label
these unknowns as state, parameter, and model uncertainty, respectively. We assume agents
are Bayesian, which means they update initial beliefs via Bayes’ rule as data arrives. Later
in the paper, we develop an extension to this model where agents can also learn from a
vector of additional macro variables and consider the case of additional learning from GDP
growth data.
1We do not consider, for instance, 1- or 4-state models as the Likelihood ratios of these relative to the 2-
or 3-state model show that the 2- and 3-state models better describe the data. As we will show, however,
there is some time-variation in whether a 2- or 3-state model matches the data better, which is one of the
reasons we entertain both of these as alternative models.
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The learning problem is as follows. We consider k = 1, ...,K models, {Mk}Kk=1, and





summarizes beliefs after observing data yt = (y1, ...yt). To















solves the parameter and state “estimation” problem conditional on a model
and p
(Mk|yt) provides model probabilities. It is important to note that this is a non-trivial,
high-dimensional learning problem, as posterior beliefs depend in a complicated manner on
past data and can vary substantially over time. The dimensionality of the posterior can be
high, in our case more than 10 dimensions.
One of our primary goals is to characterize and understand the asset pricing implications
of the transient process of learning about the parameters, states, and models.3 Learning
generates a form of nonstationarity, since parameter estimates and model probabilities are
changing through the sample. When pricing assets, this can lead to large differences between
ex ante beliefs and ex post outcomes, as shown in Cogley and Sargent (2008). Given this
nonstationarity, we are concerned with understanding the implications of learning based on
the specific experience of the U.S. post-war economy.4
To operationalize the learning problem, we need to specify the prior distribution, the
data the agent uses to update beliefs, and develop an econometric method for sampling from
the posterior distribution. In terms of data, we in a benchmark case assume that agents
learn only from observing past and current consumption growth, a common assumption in
2This is a notational abuse. In general, the state and dimension of the parameter vector should depend on
the model, thus we should superscript the parameters and states by ‘k’, θk and skt . For notational simplicity,
we drop the model dependence and denote the parameters and states as θ and st, respectively.
3These type of problems received quite a bit of theoretical attention early in the rational expectations
paradigm - see for example Bray and Savin (1986) for a discussion of model specification and convergence
to rational expectations equilibria by learning from observed outcomes.
4This is different from the standard practice of looking at population or average small-sample uncondi-
tional asset price and consumption growth moments from a model calibrated to the U.S. postwar data – we
are looking at a single outcome corresponding to the U.S. post-war economy.
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the learning literature (see, e.g., Cogley and Sargent (2008) and Hansen and Sargent (2009)).
The primary data used is the ‘standard’ data set consisting of real, per capita quarterly
consumption growth observations obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (the
National Income and Product Account tables) from 1947:Q1 until 2009:Q1.
8.3 Initial beliefs
The learning process begins with initial beliefs or the prior distribution. In terms of func-
tional forms, we assume proper, conjugate prior distributions (Raiffa and Schlaifer (1956)).
One alternative would be flat or ‘uninformative’ priors, but this is not possible in Markov
switching models, as this creates identification issues (the label switching problem) and
causes problems sampling from the posterior.5 Conjugate priors imply that the functional
form of beliefs is the same before and after sampling, are analytically tractable for econo-
metric implementation, and are flexible enough to express a wide range initial beliefs.






, the conjugate prior is
p(µi|σ2i )p(σ2i ) ∼ NIG(ai, Ai, bi, Bi), where NIG is the normal/inverse gamma distribution.
The transition probabilities are assumed to follow a Beta distribution in 2-state specification
and its generalization, the Dirichlet distribution, in models with three states. Calibration
of the hyperparameters completes the specification.
We endow our agent with economically motivated initial beliefs to study how learning
proceeds from various starting points. We consider three prior distributions and use an
‘objective’ approach to calibrate the prior parameters. The first, the ‘historical prior,’ uses
a training sample to calibrate the prior distribution. Training samples are the most common
way of generating objective prior distributions (see, e.g., O’Hagan (1994)). In this case, an
5The label switching problem refers to the fact that the likelihood function is invariant to a relabeling
of the components. For example, in a two-state model, it is possible to swap the definitions of the first and
second states and the associated parameters without changing the value of the likelihood. The solution is to
impose parameter constraints in optimization for MLE or to use informative prior distributions for Bayesian
approaches. These constraints/information often take the form of an ordering of the means or variances of
the parameters. For example in a two state model, it is common to impose that µ1 < µ2 and/or σ1 < σ2 to
breaks the symmetry of the likelihood function.
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initial data set is used to provide information on the location and scale of the parameters.
In our application, we use the annual consumption data from Shiller from 1889 until 1946.
Given the prior generated from the training sample, learning proceeds on the second data
set – in our case, the post World War II sample.6
The second is called the ‘look-ahead prior.’ This prior sets the prior mean for each
parameter equal to full-sample maximum likelihood estimates using the post World War
II sample, similar to the procedure employed in an ‘Empirical Bayes’ approach. The prior
variances are chosen to be relatively flat around these full-sample estimates, in order to
allow for meaningful learning about the parameters as new data arrives, without running
into label-switching identification problems. This approach violates the central idea of the
Bayesian approach, as the prior contains information from the sample, but it is useful for
analyzing the evolution of parameter uncertainty through the post World War II sample.
The main differences between the historical and the look-ahead priors are that the historical
priors have on average higher consumption growth volatility, shorter expansions, and longer
recessions. For the 3-state model, the disaster state is also more severe in the historical
prior, reflecting the Great Depression.
The third is called the ‘fixed parameter’ prior. This is a point-mass prior located at the
end-of-sample estimates. In this case, the agent only learns about the latent Markov state.
This prior mimics the typical rational expectations approach and allows us to separately
identify the role of state and parameter learning, since the other priors have both state and
parameter learning.
The details of the priors, the specific prior parameters chosen, as well as a description
of the econometric technique we apply to solve this high-dimensional learning problem
(particle filtering) are given in the Appendix.
6Romer (1989) presents evidence that a substantial fraction of the volatility of macro variables such as
consumption growth pre-WW2 is due to measurement error. To alleviate this concern, we set the prior mean
over the variance parameters to a quarter of the value estimated over the training sample. See the Appendix
for further details.
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Chapter 9
Time-series of subjective beliefs
This section characterizes the learning process. We first discuss state, parameter, and model
learning and their implications for the time series of conditional consumption moments, as
perceived by the Bayesian agent. Next, we empirically investigate how revisions in the
agent’s beliefs are related to stock market returns. We also consider the case of learning
from GDP data, in addition to consumption data. In the following section, we embed these
beliefs in a general equilibrium model and discuss the asset pricing implications in more
detail.
9.1 State and parameter learning
Conditional on a model specification, our agent learns about the Markov state and the
parameters, with revisions in beliefs generated by a combination of data, model specification,
and initial beliefs. To start, consider the agent’s beliefs about the current state of the
economy, st, where state 1 is an ‘expansion’ state, state 2 the ‘contraction’ state and, if a












Note that these are marginal mean state beliefs, as parameter uncertainty is integrated out.
Although st is discrete, the mean estimates need not be integer valued. Figure 9.1 displays
the posterior state beliefs over time, for each model and for different priors.
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There are a number of notable features of these beliefs. NBER recessions (shaded yellow)
and expansions are clearly identified in the models. The only exceptions are the recessions
in the late 1960s and 2001, which were not associated with substantial consumption de-
clines. Comparing the panels, one area in which the models generate strong differences is
persistence of the states. The i.i.d. model identifies recessions as a one-off negative shock,
but since shocks are i.i.d., the agent does not forecast that the recession state will persist
with high likelihood. In contrast, the 2- and 3-state models clearly show the persistence of
the recession states. Disaster states are rare – after the initial transient post war period,
there are only really two observations that place even modest probability on the disaster
state – the recession in 1981 and the financial crisis at the end of 2008. This implies that
disaster states are nearly ‘Peso’ events in the post WW2 sample.
The agent’s beliefs are quite volatile early in the sample in all of the models. This is
not surprising. Since initial parameter beliefs are highly uncertain, the agent has a difficult
time discerning the current state as parameter uncertainty exacerbates state uncertainty.
As the agent learns, parameter uncertainty decreases and state identification is easier. It
is important to note that even with full knowledge of the parameters, the agent will never
be able to perfectly identify the state.1 The results also show that the priors do not have a
large impact on the mean state beliefs, at least for the unrestricted 2- and 3-state models,
as the posterior beliefs are roughly similar for the historical and look-ahead priors.
Next, consider beliefs over parameters. Due to the large number of parameters and in the
interests of parsimony, we focus on a few of the more economically interesting and important
parameters. For the 2-state models, the top panels of Figure 9.2 display posterior means of
the beliefs over σ1 and σ2. Notice that for the Historical prior the conditional volatilities
slowly decrease, after a short (about 5 year) burn-in period, essentially throughout the
sample. This is a combination of the Great Moderation (realized consumption volatility
did decrease over the post-war sample) and the initial beliefs, which based on the historical
experience expected higher consumption growth volatility. Interestingly, for the look-ahead




, does decline over time due to decreasing parameter
uncertainty. This will be discussed further when we use GDP growth as an additional observation to help
identify the state.
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Figure 9.1: Evolution of Posterior Mean State Beliefs
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prior, which is centered at the end of sample posterior values, the agents quickly unlearns the
low full sample consumption growth volatility, and after about 5-year burn-in, the volatility
is close to that observed for the historical prior. This occur because volatility was higher in
the first portion of the sample. The subsequent decline in the volatility in the good state is
quantitatively large (about a 30% drop).
The lower panels in Figure 9.2 display the transition probabilities, pi11 and pi22. After
the burn-in period, the first is essentially increasing over the sample, while the latter is
decreasing. That is, 50 years of, on average, long expansions and high consumption growth
leads to revisions in beliefs that are manifested in higher probabilities of staying in the good
state and lower probabilities of staying in recession state. The probability of staying in a
recession, conditional on being in a recession, goes down from about 0.85 to 0.75. Clearly,
such positive shocks to the agents’ perception of the data generating process will lead to
higher ex post equity returns than compared to ex ante expectations.




for i = 1, 2, 3, as well as a posterior two standard deviation band for the 3-state model using
the historical prior. Learning is most apparent in the good state and least apparent in the
disaster state. This is intuitive, since the economy spends most of its time in the good state
and little, if any, time in the disaster state. This provides empirical evidence supporting
the argument that a high level of parameter uncertainty is a likely feature of a model with
a rarely observed state and is an important feature for disaster risk models (see also Chen,
Joslin, and Tran, 2010).
The fourth, lower right panel shows how the speed of learning differs in the three models
we consider. We use the conditional variance over the infinite horizon mean of quarterly




, as a measure of the amount of parameter un-
certainty (with no parameter uncertainty, the long-run mean of consumption growth is
constant in all models), and show this variance for the unrestricted 2- and 3-state models
normalized by the variance from the simpler i.i.d. model. The plot shows that learning
happens faster in the simpler i.i.d. model in that both the variance ratios quickly increases.
The unrestricted 2-state model settles at a variance about 50% higher than for the i.i.d. 2-
state model, while the 3-state model increases its relative amount of parameter uncertainty
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Figure 9.2: Mean Parameter Beliefs of the Volatility and Transition Probabilities
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Figure 9.3: Speed of Learning
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Figure 9.4: Marginal Model Probabilities under Different Priors
to about 3 times that of the i.i.d. model at the end of the sample. This is due to the very
slow learning about the disaster state and the difficulty present in learning the transition
probabilities.
There is additional interesting time-variation in beliefs about the parameters, but this
time-variation is best summarized via the total impact across all parameters, which is
measured via predictive moments and discussed in the next section.
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9.1.1 Beliefs about models and consumption dynamics
Figure 9.4 shows the marginal model probabilities, p
(Mk|yt), for each of the models we
consider for the Historical and the Look-ahead priors, respectively.2 For simplicity, the
prior probability of each model was set to 1/3. Note first that the posterior probability of
the i.i.d. model decreases towards zero for both priors. Thus, i.i.d. consumption growth is
rejected by a Bayesian agent that updates by observing past realized consumption growth.
Although not reported for brevity, this conclusion is robust even if the prior probability
of the i.i.d. model is set to 0.95 - in this case it takes somewhat longer (but still just a
little over half the sample) for the probability of the i.i.d. model to drop very close to
zero. The 3-state model also sees a reduction in its likelihood and ends at about 10% and
20% probability levels at the end of the sample for the Historical and Look-ahead priors,
respectively. The Look-ahead prior has a less severe disaster state, as it does not reflect the
Great Depression, and this is why the probability of the 3-state model is higher in this case.
As mentioned in the introduction, a single large negative consumption shock would quickly
change these probabilities. In sum, we observe large changes in the model uncertainty over
the sample.
The fact that the agent can learn that consumption growth is not i.i.d. is important.
Many asset pricing models specify i.i.d. consumption growth with the implicit assumption
that it is not possible or difficult to detect non-i.i.d. dynamics in consumption. Our results
show that agents, using only consumption growth data, can detect non-i.i.d. dynamics, and
can do so in real time, which is an even stronger result. The agent does not need to wait
until the end of the sample. This result holds for various prior specifications and is robust
to time-aggregation.3
2Note that marginal model probabilities (i.e., where parameter uncertainty is integrated out) penalizes
extra parameters as more sources of parameter uncertainty tends to flatten the likelihood function. Thus,
it is not the case, as we see an example of here, that a 3-state model always dominates a 2-state model in
Bayesian model selection.
3In the Appendix, we show that taking out an autocorrelation of 0.25 from the consumption growth data,
which is what time-aggregation of i.i.d. data predicts (see Working (1960)), does not qualitatively change
these results - if anything it makes the rejection of the i.i.d. model occur sooner. The same is true if we
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Figure 9.5: Quarterly Expected Consumption Growth
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The results of the previous section indicate that beliefs about the parameters vary
through the sample, even for the look-ahead prior, but it is not clear from this how much
variation in conditional moments is present.4 To provide asset-pricing relevant measures,
we report the agent’s beliefs regarding the first four moments of conditional consumption
growth and model probabilities. All of these quantities are marginal, integrating out pa-

















In describing these moments, we generally abstract from the first ten years and treat it is
a ’burn-in’ period, in order to allow the prior some time to adjust to the data, as there is
some transient volatility over these first few years.
The top two panels in Figure 9.5 (for historical and look-ahead priors, respectively)
display the conditional expected quarterly consumption growth for each model. The two and
3-state models generate relatively modest differences in this moment – both pick up business
cycle fluctuations in expected consumption growth, with the 3-state model identifying the
recessions in the early 80’s and the financial crisis in ’08 as severe. Persistent recessions
are missing from the i.i.d. model, as expected. All three models exhibit a low frequency
increase in expected consumption growth over the first half of the sample, due to parameter
learning.
The bottom panel of Figures 9.5 shows model averaged expected quarterly consumption
growth for the two priors. In the first third of the sample, the presence of the i.i.d. model
smooths business cycle fluctuations in expected consumption growth. Thereafter, only
the 2- and 3-state models are relevant and model uncertainty has a minor impact as the
conditional expected growth is similar in these models. Overall, recessions are associated
with a mean quarterly consumption growth of about 0.3%, while the mean consumption
purge the data of its full sample first order autocorrelation.
4As an example, consider the conditional volatility of consumption growth. A decrease in the probability
of the bad state, which has higher consumption growth volatility, could be offset by an increase in the
consumption volatility in the good state, σ1, keeping the total conditional volatility of consumption growth
constant.
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Figure 9.6: Quarterly Predictive Consumption Growth Standard Deviation
growth in expansions is about 0.6%. Since business cycles are relatively persistent, these
fluctuations in conditional consumption growth are a source of long-run consumption risk,
akin to that of Bansal and Yaron (2004). However, the lower frequency fluctuations we
observe in expected consumption growth, which is due to parameter learning, constitute
”truly” long-run risk, as shocks to parameter beliefs are permanent.
Turning to the conditional volatility of quarterly consumption growth, Figure 9.6 shows
that for both priors there is a downward trend in consumption growth volatility through
the sample, with marked increases during recessions for the non-i.i.d. models. Again, the
bottom panel shows the belief about conditional standard deviation for each prior when
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model uncertainty is integrated out. Model probabilities could be driven by unexpected
volatility, but this does not appear to be a primary determinant. Conditional consumption
growth volatility is not particularly affected by model uncertainty, since both the two and
the 3-state models have similar volatility patterns, and since the i.i.d. model is essentially
phased out in the first third of the sample.
The secular decline is largely driven by downward revisions in estimates of the volatility
parameters as realized consumption growth was less volatile in the second half of this
century. This is particularly strong for the historical prior, as the conditional volatility of
consumption growth decreases from about 1% per quarter to about 0.5%. Interestingly,
the look-ahead prior has a similar trend, after a short burn-in period, as the prior’s low
consumption growth volatility is quickly unlearned, though the size of the effect is about
half as large. This is the Great Moderation - the fact that consumption volatility has
decreased also over the post-war sample. In the models considered here, the agent learning
in real-time perceives this decrease to happen gradually, in contrast to studies that find ex
post evidence of structural breaks or regime shifts at certain dates.
Every recession is associated with higher consumption growth volatility, although the
size of the increase varies. The largest increase, on a percentage basis, occurs with the
financial crisis of 2008. The increase is largest in the 3-state model, as the mean state belief
at this time approaches the third state, which has a very high volatility. There is little
updating about the volatility of the disaster state through the sample, since there have
been no prolonged visits to this state. Thus, this reflects the fear that prevailed in the fall
of 2008 that the economy was potentially headed into a depression not seen since the 1930s.
This econometric result squares nicely with anecdotes from the crisis.
Figure 9.7 shows the time-series of conditional consumption growth skewness for the
both priors, again with the model averaged estimates in the bottom panel. The time-
variation in the conditional skewness is dominated by business cycle variation for the two
and 3-state models, and there is a slight downward trend, as the probability of a disaster and
recession decrease. When the economy is in a recession, consumption growth is naturally
less negatively skewed for two reasons: (1) there is a high probability that the economy
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Figure 9.7: Quarterly Predictive Consumption Growth Skewness
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jumps to a higher (i.e. better) state and (2) expected consumption volatility is high, which
tends to decrease skewness. Note that in terms of skewness, the 3-state model, with its
severe recession (disaster) state, is quite different from the 2-state model. Thus model
uncertainty plays a larger role for the agent’s overall consumption beliefs in terms of the
skewness. The 3-state model, especially for the Historical prior, strongly impacts the total
perception of conditional consumption growth skewness as given in the bottom panel.
Figure 9.8 shows the time-series of conditional consumption growth kurtosis for the both
priors. Conditional kurtosis is lower in bad states as these states are the least persistent
and volatility is highest. Large, rare, outcomes are more likely when the economy is in the
good state. This has potentially interesting option pricing implications (see, e.g., Backus,
Chernov, and Martin (2009)), as the skewness and kurtosis will be related to volatility
smiles. It is worth noting that parameter uncertainty gives an extra ’kick’ to conditional
skewness and kurtosis measures relative to the case of fixed parameters, where the skewness
and kurtosis both move little over time (the fixed parameter case is not reported here for
brevity). Both for skewness and kurtosis, there is clear evidence of parameter learning over
the business cycle: the skewness becomes more negative and the kurtosis higher the longer
an expansion last, reflecting updating of the transition probabilities, which reflect business
cycle dynamics. Similar to skewness, there are now relatively large differences between the
2- and 3-state models. The 3-state model has significantly higher conditional kurtosis than
the 2-state model, due to the presence of the disaster-state. Interestingly, the differences
are greater in expansions than in recessions, again due to the ’rare’ nature of recessions
and, especially, disasters. In terms of the conditional kurtosis after model uncertainty is
integrated out (bottom panel), the 3-state model has large impact on kurtosis even at the
end of the sample where the probability of this model being the right model is low. Thus,
among the models considered here, model uncertainty and its dynamic behavior is likely to
have the strongest implications for assets such as out-of-the-money options that are more
sensitive to the tail behavior of consumption growth.
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Figure 9.8: Quarterly Predictive Consumption Growth Kurtosis
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Chapter 10
Does learning matter for asset
prices?
10.1 A new test for the importance of learning
The previous results indicate that the agent’s beliefs – about parameters, moments, and
models – vary substantially at both very low frequencies and over the business cycle. If
learning is an important determinant of asset prices, changes in beliefs should be a significant
determinant of asset returns. This is a fundamental test of the importance of learning about
the consumption dynamics. For example, if agents learn that expected consumption growth
is higher than previously thought, this revision in beliefs will be reflected in the aggregate
wealth-consumption ratio (if the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is different from
one). In particular, if the substitution effect dominates, the wealth-consumption ratio
will increase when agents revise their beliefs about the expected consumption growth rate
upwards (see, e.g., Bansal and Yaron (2004)). As another example, if agents learn that
aggregate risk (consumption growth volatility) is lower than previously thought, this will
generally lead to a change in asset prices as both the risk premium and the risk-free rate
are affected. In the Bansal and Yaron (2004) model, an increase in the aggregate volatility
leads to a decrease in the stock market’s price-dividend ratio.
To test this, we regress excess quarterly stock market returns (obtained from Kenneth
French’s web site) on changes in beliefs about expected consumption growth and expected
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consumption growth variance. This is a particularly stringent test of learning, which to our
knowledge has not been done in the previous literature. We use the beginning of period
timing for the consumption data here and elsewhere in the paper.1 The regressors are the
shocks, Et (∆ct+1)−Et−1 (∆ct+1) and σt (∆ct+1)−σt−1 (∆ct+1). Notice that the only thing
that is changing is the conditioning information set as we go from time t− 1 to time t; the
regressors are revisions in beliefs. We calculate these conditional moments for each prior
integrating out state, model and parameter uncertainty. The first 10 years of the sample
are used as a burn-in period to alleviate any prior misspecification (there is some excess
volatility in state and parameter beliefs in these first years).
Separate regressions are run for the historical and look-ahead priors, and we control
for contemporaneous consumption growth and lagged consumption growth (the direct cash
flow effect). By controlling for realized consumption growth, we ensure that the results are
driven by model-based revisions in beliefs, and not just the fact that realized consumption
growth (a direct cash flow effect) was, for example, unexpectedly high. To separate out the
effects of parameter from state learning, we use revisions in expected consumption growth
beliefs computed from the 3-state model with fixed parameters (set to their full-sample
values) as an additional control.2
Specifications 1 and 2 in Panel A (historical prior) and Panel B (look-ahead prior) in
Table 10.1 show that increases in expected conditional consumption growth are positively
and strongly significantly associated with excess contemporaneous stock returns for both
priors. This result holds controlling for contemporaneous and lagged consumption growth
(the direct cash flow effect), and so we can conclude that revisions in beliefs are significantly
related to shocks to the price-dividend ratio. This is a very strong result, pointing to the
importance of a learning-based explanation for realized stock returns. These results could
1Due to time-averaging (see Working, 1960), Campbell (1999) notes that one can use either beginning of
period or end of period consumption in a given quarter as the consumption for that quarter. The beginning
of period timing yields stronger results than using the end of period convention (although the signs are
the same in the regressions). In principle, the results should be the same, so this is consistent with some
information being impounded in stocks before the consumption data is revealed to the Bureau of Economic
Analysis.
2Using the fixed parameter 2-state model as the control instead does not change the results.
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Table 10.1: Updates in Beliefs versus Realized Stock Returns
Dependent variable: rm,t+1 − rf,t+1 (excess market returns)



























]− Et [∆ct+2]]i.i.d. modelθ unknown (392.94)
R2adj 8.8% 10.9% 5.9% 8.4% 9.5% 5.0% 9.7%



























]− Et [∆ct+2]]i.i.d. modelθ unknown −427.05
(400.75)
R2adj 7.3% 10.5% 5.9% 7.2% 9.5% 5.3% 10.2%
be driven by parameter or state learning.
Specification 3 shows that the updates in expected consumption growth derived from the
model with fixed parameters (that is, a case with state learning only) are also significantly
related to realized stock returns. The R2, however, is lower than for the case of the full
learning model, and when we include the revisions in beliefs about expected consumption
growth from both the full learning model and the fixed parameters benchmark model in
the regression (specification 4), the updates in expected consumption growth that arise
in a model with fixed parameters are insignificant, while the belief revisions from the full
learning model remain significant. That is, updates in expectations when learning about
about parameters, states, and models are more closely related to realized stock market
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returns than the corresponding updates in expectations based on a single model with known
parameters but hidden states estimated on the full sample. To our knowledge, this is the
first direct comparison of learning about models and parameters versus the traditional
implementation of the rational expectation explanations in terms of explaining the time-
series of realized stock returns using the actual sequence of realized macro shocks.
This result is driven by the nonlinear process of jointly learning about parameters and
states. In particular, specification 5 shows that updates in beliefs from the i.i.d. model
cannot be distinguished from the direct cash flow effect. The i.i.d. model captures param-
eter uncertainty about the long-run mean and variance, but not the state dynamics. The
fixed parameter model (specification 4) captures the transitory state learning, but not the
parameter dynamics.3 Thus, it is the updates in beliefs stemming from the more compli-
cated, non-i.i.d. models’ learning problem that drives the increased correlation with stock
returns, relative to the direct cash flow effect. Recall also that our agent quickly learned
that the i.i.d. model is not likely, relative to the other specifications.
For the variance (regression specifications 6 and 7 in Table 10.1) we get the opposite
result, as one would expect (at least with a high elasticity of intertemporal substitution,
as we will use later in the paper): unexpected increases in conditional consumption growth
variance are associated with negative contemporaneous stock returns. This result is not
significant at the 5% level when including contemporaneous and lagged consumption growth
in the regressions (specification 7). This does not mean there is no effect; we just cannot
distinguish it from the direct cash flow effect when learning from consumption data alone.
To summarize, we find strong evidence that the updates in beliefs elicited from our
model/prior combinations are associated with actual updates in agent beliefs at the time,
as proxied by stock market returns. Again, it is important to recall that no asset price data
was used to generate these belief revisions.
3One can show analytically that in a simple i.i.d. model, updates in expectations of consumption growth
are very close to linear in the realized consumption growth.
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10.2 Learning from additional macro variables
Agents have access to more than just aggregate consumption growth data when forming
beliefs. Here we provide one approach for incorporating this additional information and
apply this methodology to learning from quarterly GDP growth, in addition to consumption.
Suppose xt represents the common growth factor in the economy and evolves via:
xt = µst + σstεt, (10.1)
where εt
i.i.d.∼ N (0, 1), and st is the state of the economy, which follows the same Markov








are assumed to follow:




yjt = αj + βjxt + σjε
j
t , for j = 1, 2, ..., J (10.3)
and εct
i.i.d.∼ N (0, 1), and εjt i.i.d.∼ N (0, 1) for any j. Note that the coefficients in equation
(10.3) are not state dependent, which implies that the additional variables will primarily aid
in state identification. The specification allows for the additional observation variables to be
stronger or weaker signals of the underlying state of the economy than consumption growth.
For the case of GDP growth, this captures the idea that investment is more cyclical than
consumption, which makes GDP growth a better business cycle indicator. The linearity of
the relationship is an assumption that is needed for conjugate priors.
The similar conjugate priors for the parameters are applied. For each state st = i,
p(µi|σ2i )p(σ2i ) ∼ NIG(ai, Ai, bi, Bi), where NIG is the normal/inverse gamma distribution.
σc is assumed to follow an inverse gamma distribution IG(bc, Bc), and for each j = 1, 2, ..., J ,
p([αj , βj ]
′|σ2j )p(σ2j ) ∼ NIG(aj , Aj , bj , Bj), where p([αj , βj ]′|σ2j ) is a bivariate normal distri-
bution N (aj , Ajσ2j ), aj is a 2 × 1 vector and Aj is a 2 × 2 matrix. Particle filtering is
straightforward to implement in this specification by modifying the algorithm described in
the Appendix.
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To analyze the implications of additional information, we consider learning using real,
per capita U.S. GDP growth as an additional source of information. This exercise generates
a battery of results: time series of parameter beliefs, conditional moments, and model
probabilities. We report only a few interesting statistics in the interests of parsimony.
Figure 10.1 shows that the state beliefs do not change dramatically, although GDP growth is
typically thought of as more informative about business cycle fluctuations than consumption
growth. To characterize how the additional data aids in state identification, we compute




, again integrating out parameter
uncertainty. The top Panel of Figure 10.2, shows that indeed the uncertainty about the
state is much lower (about half) than what was the case when using consumption growth
as the only source of information. Thus, adding GDP growth to the agent’s information set
increases the precision of the state identification.4 The increased certainty about the state
improves parameter identification also, which is confirmed in the two lower Panels in Figure
10.2. Here the uncertainty about the good and bad states mean consumption growth rates
is lower, after a 10-year burn-in, than in the case using consumption as the only source of
information.
Figure 10.3 shows that the model specification results are similar, as the data again
favors the 2-state model, leaving the 3-state model with a very low probability at the end of
the sample. It is noteworthy, however, that the probability of the 3-state (disaster) model
again increases at the onset of the financial crisis in 2008.
Adding GDP growth also results in a greater difference in expected consumption growth
across the states. Figure 10.4 shows that the difference in the expected consumption growth
rate in recessions versus expansions is about 0.6% per quarter, versus about 0.3% in the case
of consumption information only (see Figure 9.5). The dynamic behavior of the conditional
standard deviation of consumption growth is not significantly changed (not reported for
brevity).
4It is technically feasible to impose cointegration between consumption and GDP by including the log
consumption to GDP ratio on the right hand side of Equation (10.3). We thank Lars Hansen for pointing
this out.
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Figure 10.1: Evolution of Mean State Beliefs with GDP
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Uncertainty of µ1 in 2−State Model with Look−ahead Prior
 
 








Uncertainty of µ2 in 2−State Model with Look−ahead Prior
 
 
















Figure 10.2: Uncertainty about state identification with/without GDP
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Sequential Model Probabilities with Equal Model Prior under Historical Parameters Prior (with GDP)
 
 
















Figure 10.3: Marginal Model Probabilities with GDP.
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Figure 10.4: Conditional Expected Consumption Growth with GDP
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Table 10.2 shows the regressions of contemporaneous stock returns and updates in agent
beliefs about conditional expected consumption growth and consumption growth variance,
as calculated from this extended model. The results are similar, but in fact overall stronger
than the results using only consumption growth. Updates in agent expectations about these
moments from the full learning model are significantly related to stock returns, also after
controlling for contemporaneous and lagged consumption growth and updates in expected
consumption growth derived from a model with fixed parameters. Again, this evidence
indicates that learning about parameters and models is an important feature of the data.
10.3 Additional asset pricing implications
We now embed the beliefs of our learning agent in a general equilibrium asset pricing model.
There are considerable computational and technical issues that need to be dealt with when
considering such an exercise. First, the state space is prohibitively large. The 3-state model,
as an example, have 12 parameters governing the exogenous consumption process, and the
beliefs over each parameter are governed by 2 hyper-parameters. Thus, there are 24 state
variables, in addition to beliefs over the state of the economy and the corresponding param-
eter and state beliefs for the i.i.d. and the general 2-state models. Second, as pointed out
by Geweke (2001) and Weitzmann (2007), some parameter distributions must be truncated
in order for utility to be finite. This introduces additional nuisance parameters.
Given the computational impediments, we follow Sargent and Cogley (2008) and Piazzesi
and Schneider (2010) and apply the principle of ”anticipated utility” to the pricing exercise
(originally suggested by Kreps (1998)). Under this assumption, the agents maximize utility
at each point in time assuming that the parameters and model probabilities are equal to
the agents’ current mean beliefs and will remain constant forever. Of course, at time t+ 1
the mean parameter beliefs will in general be different due to learning. While parameter
and model uncertainty are not priced risk factors in this framework, they are nonetheless
important for the time-series of asset prices as updates in mean parameter and model beliefs
lead to changes in prices. We do integrate out state uncertainty in the pricing exercise, so
state uncertainty is a priced risk factor (as in, e.g., Lettau, Ludvigson, and Wachter (2008)).
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Table 10.2: Updates in Beliefs versus Realized Stock Returns with GDP
Dependent variable: rm,t+1 − rf,t+1 (excess market returns)
Panel A: Historical Prior 1 2 3 4 5
Et+1 [∆ct+2]− Et [∆ct+2] 40.68∗∗∗ 40.52∗∗∗ 39.77∗∗
(6.62) (8.99) (19.13)







[Et+1 [∆ct+2]− Et [∆ct+2]]3-state modelθ known 0.60
(10.47)
R2adj 15.4% 15.6% 15.0% 11.9% 13.3%
Panel B: Look-ahead Prior 1 2 3 4 5
Et+1 [∆ct+2]− Et [∆ct+2] 33.48∗∗∗ 30.84∗∗∗ 28.41∗∗
(5.56) (7.24) (14.03)







[Et+1 [∆ct+2]− Et [∆ct+2]]3-state modelθ known 3.89
(9.20)
R2adj 14.5% 15.0% 14.1% 9.3% 11.9%
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The anticipated utility approach reduces the number of state variables to three (the belief
about the state in the general 2-state model, and the 2-dimensional belief about the state
in the 3-state model).5
The purpose of the pricing exercise is to examine what features of the post-WW2 U.S.
aggregate consumption and asset price data a realistic, general learning problem can help
explain. Since we do not integrate out the parameter and model uncertainty in the pricing
exercise, we focus on two aspects of the model that are likely to be robust to the introduction
of priced parameter and model uncertainty.
1. Ex-ante versus ex post
With learning ex ante expectations need not in general equal average ex post out-
comes, which is the assumption in the typical rational expectations implementation.
In the following, we argue that substantial components of the observed equity pre-
mium, excess return volatility, the degree of in-sample excess return predictability,
and the time-series of the aggregate price-dividend ratio can be explained by the
(nonstationary) time-path of mean parameter beliefs.
2. Permanent versus transitory shocks
The shocks to mean parameter beliefs are permanent shocks to investor information
sets. This has implications for, for instance, the volatility of long-run bond yields,
and is different from a model with transitory shocks to state variables (such as our
state beliefs, the long-run risk variable in Bansal and Yaron (2004), or the surplus
consumption ratio in Campbell and Cochrane (1999)).
10.3.1 The model
The model is solved at the quarterly frequency, and the representative agent is assumed to
have Epstein and Zin (1989) preferences, which are defined recursively as:
Ut =
{










5It would be computationally feasible to account for model uncertainty or to focus on parameter uncer-
tainty over one of the parameters, but we leave such considerations for future research.
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where Ct is the consumption, ψ 6= 1 is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES) in
consumption, and γ 6= 1 is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. These preferences imply












where PCt is the wealth-consumption ratio – that is, the price-dividend ratio for the claim
to the stream of future aggregate consumption. The first component of the pricing kernel
is that which obtains under standard power utility, while the second component is present
if the agent has a preference for the timing of the resolution of uncertainty (i.e., if γ 6=
1/ψ). As mentioned earlier, we consider an anticipated utility approach to the pricing
problem in terms of parameter and model uncertainty, while state uncertainty is priced.6
This corresponds to a world where investors understand and account for business cycle
fluctuations, but where they simply use their best guess for the parameters governing these
dynamics.
Our goal in this section is to, for reasonable preference parameters, understand how
learning affects pricing relative to the benchmark case of fixed parameters. Given that
the consumption dynamics are not ex post calibrated (in particular in the historical prior
case) but estimated in real-time, we also do not calibrate preference parameters to match
any particular moment(s). Instead, we simply use the preference parameters of Bansal and
Yaron (2004). Thus, γ = 10, ψ = 1.5, and β = 0.998ˆ3.
Following both Bansal and Yaron (2004) and Lettau, Ludvigson, and Wachter (2008),
we price a levered claim to the consumption stream with a leverage factor λ of 4.5. The
annual consumption volatility over the post-war sample is only 1.34%, and so the systematic
6The model is solved numerically through value function iteration at each time t in the sample, conditional
on the mean parameter beliefs at time t, which gives the time t asset prices. The state variables when solving
this model are the beliefs about the hidden states of the economy for each model under consideration. For
a detailed description of the model solution algorithm, please refer to the Appendix.
Cogley and Sargent (2009) argue that anticipated utility approach is a close approximation to the true
Bayesian approach, although their analysis is with respect to time-separable preferences. Piazzesi and
Schneider (2010) is an example of a recent application of an anticipated utility pricing framework with
Epstein-Zin preferences.
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annual dividend volatility is therefore about 6%. Quarterly log dividend growth is defined
as:
∆dt = λ∆ct + εd,t, (10.6)
where εd,t
i.i.d.∼ N (−12σ2d, σ2d) is the idiosyncratic component of dividend growth. σd is chosen
to match the observed annual 11.5% volatility of dividend growth reported in Bansal and
Yaron (2004). With these choices of λ and σd we also in fact closely match the sample
correlation they report between annual consumption and dividend growth (0.55).7
Unconditional Moments Table 10.3 reports realized asset pricing moments in the data,
and also those generated by our learning models over the same sample period. The first 10
years are removed as a burn-in period to reduce concerns with regards to prior misspecifi-
cation. We consider cases with and without parameter learning.
The models with parameter uncertainty match the observed equity premium reasonably
well: 4.7% in the data versus 3.8% and 3.4% for the consumption only historical and look-
ahead priors, respectively. The models where GDP is used as an additional signal, which
as reported earlier have a more severe recession state, have average sample excess equity
returns of 4.2% and 4.0% for the historical and the look-ahead priors, respectively. This
compares favorably to the benchmark fixed parameters two and 3-state models which sample
equity premiums are 1.5% and 1.8%, respectively. Thus, allowing for parameter uncertainty
more than doubles the sample risk premiums, despite the fact that parameter and model
uncertainty are not priced risk factors in the anticipated utility pricing framework. The
high sample equity premium arises because of the specific time path of beliefs, which we
discuss next.







where It denotes the information set (beliefs) of agents at time t and ET [·] denotes the
7The dividend dynamics imply that consumption and dividends are not cointegrated, which is a com-
mon assumption (e.g., Campbell and Cochrane (1999), and Bansal and Yaron (2004)). One could impose
cointegration between consumption and dividends, but at the cost of an additional state variable. Further,
it is possible to also learn about λ and σ2d. However, quarterly dividends are highly seasonal, which would
severely complicate such an analysis. Further, data on stock repurchases is mainly annual. We leave a
rigorous treatment of these issues to future research.
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Table 10.3: Asset Price Moments
Data Historical prior Look-ahead prior Fixed parameters
1957:Q2- Cons. Cons. + Cons. Cons. + 2-state 3-state
Moments 2009:Q1 only GDP only GDP model model
The real risk-free rate:
ET (r
f
t ) 1.6% 3.8% 3.7% 3.7% 3.7% 3.7% 3.7%
σT (r
f
t ) 1.6% 0.8% 0.9% 0.6% 0.8% 0.7% 0.8%
The dividend claim: dt = λct + εd,t
ex post:
ET (rt − rft ) 4.7% 3.8% 4.2% 3.4% 4.0% 1.5% 1.8%
σT (rt − rft ) 17.1% 15.6% 15.7% 15.5% 15.4% 12.2% 12.4%
Sharpe ratio 0.27 0.24 0.27 0.22 0.26 0.12 0.14





t ) n/a 0.37 0.53 0.31 0.52 0.24 0.25
ex ante:
ET [Et(rt+1 − rft+1)] n/a 1.5% 1.7% 1.4% 1.6% 1.5% 1.8%
sample average). The cases with parameter and model learning have about the same ex
ante risk premium. This implies that more than half of the excess returns achieved in these
models occur due to ex post positive surprises in updates of beliefs. This is one of the
primary implications of learning for this sample. Interestingly, after the burn-in period,
this effect is also strong in the look-ahead prior. With parameter and model uncertainty,
agents beliefs quickly deviate from their full sample estimates, highlighting the difficulty
of learning in real-time, similar to the problem faced by an econometrician. In particular,
the sequence of shocks realized over the post-war sample generate a times series of beliefs
that have a systematic time series pattern: the initial low mean and high volatility of
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consumption growth causes an upward revision in the mean growth rates and a negative
revision in the volatility parameters, as described in Section 3. Fama and French (2002)
reach a similar conclusion in terms of the ex post versus the ex ante risk premium when
looking at the time-series of the aggregate price-earnings and price-dividend ratios. Sargent
and Cogley (2008) assume negatively biased beliefs in their model to highlight the same
mechanism. The results we present here are consistent with their conclusions, but our
models are estimated from fundamentals alone.
The equity return volatility is, in all the cases permitting parameter and model uncer-
tainty, close to the 17.1% annual return volatility in the data (from 15.4% to 15.7%). In
contrast, the equity return volatility in the models with fixed parameters is about 12%,
which is almost all cash flow volatility as the annual dividend growth volatility is 11.5%.
Thus, the sample variation in discount and growth rates arising from updates in agents’
beliefs cause excess return volatility (Shiller, 1980). This is reflected in the sample volatility
of the log price-dividend ratio, which is 0.38 in the data. In the cases with parameter and
model uncertainty the volatility of the log price-dividend ratio lies between 0.26 and 0.29.8
While this is only about three quarters of its volatility in the data, it is 4 to 5 times the
volatility of the log price-dividend ratio in the benchmark fixed parameters models (here
the volatility of the log price-dividend ratio is 0.06 for the 2-state model and 0.07 for the
3-state model).
The sample correlation between the log price-dividend ratios from the model versus the
data, is 0.53 and 0.52 for the models using both GDP and consumption to estimate beliefs
and 0.31 and 0.37 for the models using consumption only to estimate beliefs. The models
with fixed parameters have lower correlations, 0.24 for the 2-state model and 0.25 for the
3-state model. As an alternative measure of the fit between the time-series of the sample
price-level in the data versus those in the models considered here, the highest covariance
between the price-dividend ratio in the data and the models with parameter and model
uncertainty is 0.0573, whereas the highest covariance between the price-dividend ratio in
8The price-dividend ratio in each model is calculated as the corresponding in the data by summing the
last four quarters of payouts to get annual payout. The price-dividend ratio from the data includes share
repurchases in its definition of total dividends.
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the data and the models with fixed parameters is 0.0067 – a difference close to an order of
magnitude. Thus, with parameter and model learning the model tracks the aggregate stock
market price level (normalized by dividends) much more closely than either of the models
we consider with fixed parameters. The price-level, a first order moment, is arguably even
more important than matching the second order moments that usually are the focus in asset
pricing.
As a formal test of the learning model’s match of the aggregate stock price level (the
log D/P ratio) relative to the fixed parameter benchmark model, we run the following
regression:




t + εt, (10.7)
where dpdatat refers to the historical quarterly log dividend price ratio of the market portfolio,
dpParModUnct refers to the log dividend price ratio from the model with parameter and model
uncertainty, and dpFP3t refers to the log dividend price ratio from the fixed parameters, 3-
state model. The first four columns of Table 10.4 shows that the regression coefficient
on the model with parameter and model uncertainty (β1) is significant at the 1% level
for both the historical and look-ahead priors, as well as whether learning is from realized
consumption growth only or also including realized GDP growth. The R2 ranges from 12%
to 26% and is the lowest for the look-ahead prior with learning from consumption only, and
the highest for the historical prior with learning from both consumption and GDP growth.
As before, the results are shown after a 10-year burn-in period, from 1957 to 2009. The
coefficient on the dividend yield from the fixed parameters model is insignificant in all of
these cases. The fifth column of Table 10.4 shows the regression with only the dividend
yield from the fixed parameters model. It is significant in this case, but the R2 is only 6%.
Finally, the last column of the table shows the regression with both the dividend yield from
the fixed parameter model and the dividend yield from the historical prior with learning
from both GDP and consumption growth, but where the dividend yield from the model
with parameter and model learning has been orthogonalized with respect to the dividend
yield from the fixed parameter model. The coefficient on the orthogonalized dividend yield
(β1) is still significant at the 1% level which implies that including the dividend yield from
the model with parameter and model learning leads to a statistically significant (at the 1%
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level) increase in the R2, relative to the fixed parameters benchmark case. The increase in
fit from the full learning models stems from a better match of the business cycle fluctuations
in the dividend yield, as well as low-frequency fluctuations. In particular, with parameter
learning the dividend yield displays a downward trend over the sample, similar to that found
in the data as documented by, for instance, Fama and French (2002).
In sum, including parameter and model uncertainty leads to not only better fit of the
unconditional asset pricing moments, but a significantly better fit of the realized aggregate
stock price level in the post-WW2 era.
Table 10.4: Dividend Yield Regression
Historical Prior Look-ahead Prior Fixed parameters Historical Prior
Cons. Cons. Cons. Cons. 3-state model Cons. + GDP
V ariables only + GDP Only + GDP only (orthogonal)
constant 0.82 0.19 1.25 0.16 1.86 1.86
(1.82) (1.72) (1.91) (1.71) (2.06) (1.86)
pdParModUnc 0.47∗∗∗ 0.79∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.61∗∗∗ 0.79∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.14) (0.12) (0.11) (0.14)
pdFP3 0.73 0.28 0.92∗ 0.40 1.45∗∗∗ 1.45∗∗∗
(0.46) (0.43) (0.49) (0.43) (0.56) (0.51)
R2 15.0% 25.8% 11.7% 20.0% 6.2% 25.8%
Permanent shocks and the volatility of long-run yields. With parameter and
model uncertainty, the updates in mean beliefs constitute permanent shocks to expectations
about consumption growth rates, consumption growth volatility, and higher order moments.
This is a distinguishing feature of models with learning about constant quantities relative
to learning about or observing a stationary underlying process (such as our state of the
Markov chain, long-run risk in Bansal and Yaron (2004), or the surplus consumption ratio
in Campbell and Cochrane (1999)). The latter models have transitory variables only in
marginal utility growth. Shocks to a transitory state variable eventually die out, and so
(very) long-run expectations are constant. Shocks to, for instance, the mean belief about
CHAPTER 10. DOES LEARNING MATTER FOR ASSET PRICES? 101
the unconditional growth rate of consumption are, on the other hand, permanent, leading
to permanent shocks to marginal utility growth. This has implications for all asset prices,
but can be most clearly seen when considering the volatility of long-run default-free real
yields, which can be readily calculated from our model. Table 10.5 shows the volatility
of annualized yields for default-free real, zero-coupon bonds at different maturities. The
data column gives the volatility of yields on U.S. TIPS, calculated from monthly data for
the longest available sample, 2003 to 2011, from the Federal Reserve Board, along with
the standard error of the volatility estimates. In the remaining columns, the corresponding
model-implied yield volatilities, calculated from each of the models considered in this paper
over the post-WW2 sample, are given.
First, the yield volatilities for the models with parameter and model uncertainty are
substantially higher than the yield volatilities from the models with fixed parameters. The
2-year yields are twice as volatile, while the 10-year yields are an order of magnitude more
volatile. This is a direct consequence of the permanent shocks to expectations resulting
from parameter learning, whereas the models with fixed parameters have constant long-run
consumption growth mean and volatility. Notably, the long maturity yields in the data have
about the same yield volatility as in the models with parameter uncertainty, and so this
is another dimension along which learning about parameters and models can help explain
historical asset pricing behavior.
Table 10.5: Real Risk-free Yield Volatilities
TIPS Data Consumption Consumption,GDP Fixed Parameters
(2003 – 2011) (s.e.) Historical Lookahead Historical Lookahead 2-state 3-state
5-yr yield 0.75% 0.35% 0.30% 0.44% 0.39% 0.17% 0.19%
(0.18%)
10-yr yield 0.45% 0.31% 0.27% 0.42% 0.36% 0.09% 0.10%
(0.11%)
20-yr yield 0.30% 0.30% 0.26% 0.42% 0.35% 0.05% 0.06%
(0.06%)
30-yr yield n/a 0.30% 0.25% 0.42% 0.35% 0.03% 0.03%
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Return Predictability Lastly, we consider excess market return forecasting regression
using the dividend yield as the predictive variable. These regressions have a long history
in asset pricing and remain a feature of the data that asset pricing models typically aim
to explain (e.g., Campbell and Cochrane (1999), Bansal and Yaron (2004)). However,
the strength of the empirical evidence is under debate (see, e.g., Stambaugh (1999), Ang
and Bekaert (2007), Boudoukh, Richardson and Whitelaw (2008), and Goyal and Welch
(2008) for critical analyses). Here we run standard forecasting regressions overlapping at
the quarterly frequency using the sample of market returns and dividend yields as implied
by each of the models. Note that, as before, we are not looking at population moments or
average small-sample moments, but the single sample generated by feeding the models the
actual sample of realized consumption growth.
Table 10.6 shows the forecasting regressions over different return forecasting horizons
from the data. We use both the market dividend yield and the approximation to the
consumption-wealth ratio, cay, of Lettau and Ludvigson (2001) to show the amount of pre-
dictability implied by these regressions in the data. We then run the same regressions using
model implied returns and dividend yields. The benchmark models with fixed parameters
(bottom right in the table) show no evidence of return predictability at the 5% significance
level and the R2’s are very small. These models do, in fact, feature time-variation in the
equity risk premium, but the standard deviation of the risk premiums are only about 0.5%
per year and so the signal-to-noise ratio in these regressions is too small to result in signifi-
cant predictability in a sample of the length we consider here. The models with parameter
uncertainty, however, display significant in-sample return predictability and the regression
coefficients and the R2’s are large and increasing in the forecasting horizon similar to those
in the data. The ex ante predictability in these models is in fact similar to that in the
fixed parameters cases, but since the parameters are updated at each point in time, there
is significant ex post predictability. For instance, an increase in the mean parameters of
consumption growth leads to high returns and lower dividend yield. Thus, a high dividend
yield in sample forecasts high excess returns in sample. This is the same effect of learning
as that pointed out in Timmermann (1993) and Lewellen and Shanken (2002). The models
here show that the significant regression coefficients in the classical forecasting regressions
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show up in the sample only in the model where there is parameter learning which generates
a significant difference between ex ante expected returns and ex post realizations. Thus, the
model predicts that the amount of predictability is much smaller out-of-sample, consistent
with the empirical evidence in Goyal and Welch (2008) and Ang and Bekaert (2007).
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Table 10.6: Return Forecasting Regressions
rt,t+q − rf,t,t+q = αq + βq,dp ln (Dt/Pt) + εt,t+q
Data Historical prior





Cons. only Cons. and GDP
q βdp (s.e.) R
2
adj βdp (s.e.) R
2
adj βdp (s.e.) R
2
adj βdp (s.e.) R
2
adj
1 1.19∗∗∗ 4.67% 0.03∗ 1.6% 0.04 1.4% 0.03 1.3%
(0.31) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
4 4.29∗∗∗ 15.65% 0.11∗∗ 6.6% 0.18∗∗ 8.3% 0.14∗∗ 6.8%
(1.18) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06)
8 7.60∗∗∗ 28.1% 0.17∗ 8.5% 0.38∗∗∗ 19.2% 0.28∗∗∗ 13.7%
(1.72) (0.10) (0.09) (0.08)
16 12.31∗∗∗ 41.6% 0.22∗∗ 9.5% 0.61∗∗∗ 28.4% 0.44∗∗∗ 17.9%
(1.82) (0.11) (0.15) (0.13)
Look-ahead prior Fixed parameters
Cons. only Cons. and GDP 2-state model 3-state model
q βdp (s.e.) R
2
adj βdp (s.e.) R
2
adj βdp (s.e.) R
2
adj βdp (s.e.) R
2
adj
1 0.03 1.3% 0.03 0.9% −0.01 0.0% 0.004 0.0%
(0.02) (0.03) (0.062) (0.062)
4 0.18∗∗ 7.7% 0.15∗∗ 5.4% 0.19 1.0% 0.20 1.2%
(0.07) (0.07) (0.17) (0.16)
8 0.38∗∗∗ 18.3% 0.29∗∗ 10.8% 0.37∗ 2.3% 0.41∗ 2.7%
(0.12) (0.09) (0.24) (0.23)
16 0.64∗∗∗ 28.9% 0.42∗∗ 13.0% 0.26 0.7% 0.28 0.8%
(0.17) (0.17) (0.31) (0.30)
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Chapter 11
Conclusion
This paper studies the statistical problem and asset pricing implications of learning about
parameters, states, and models in a standard class of models for consumption dynamics.
Our approach is empirical, focuses on the specific implications generated by learning about
U.S. consumption dynamics during the post World War II period, and contributes to a
growing empirical literature documenting the importance of learning for asset prices (e.g.,
Malmendier and Nagel (2011), and Pastor and Veronesi (2003)).
We find broad support for the importance of learning about parameters and models.
Agents’ beliefs about consumption growth dynamics are strongly time-varying, nonstation-
ary, and help explain the realized time-series of equity returns and price-dividend ratio.
In particular, the new and significant relationship we document between contemporaneous
realized returns and revisions in beliefs is strong support for the importance of learning. In-
corporating learning and our estimated time-series of beliefs in a general equilibrium model
uniformly improves the model fit with respect to the standard asset pricing moments.
Taken together, this evidence questions the typical implementations of rational expec-
tations consumption-based exchange economy models, in which agents know with certainty
the data generating process for aggregate consumption growth. Further, the nonstation-
ary dynamics induced by learning about fixed quantities such as parameters and models
translates to nonstationary dynamics in marginal utility growth and asset valuation ratios.
This, in turn, implies that standard econometric approaches to model tests and parameter
estimation should be used with caution (see also Cogley and Sargent (2008)).
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The procedure implemented in this paper can in a straightforward way be implemented
for other countries or markets, or extended to multi-country or multi-asset settings. For
instance, learning about the joint dynamics of dividends and consumption is an interesting
exercise abstracted away from in this paper. In terms of other countries, it is clear that
the post World War II experience of Japan would lead to a very different path of beliefs.
Learning about the joint dynamics of, say, the U.S. and Japan’s economies would have
interesting implications, not only for their respective equity markets, but also for the real
exchange rate dynamics. It will in future research be interesting to consider priced param-
eter uncertainty with Epstein-Zin preferences. Parameter and model uncertainty will be
major sources of anxiety for agents with preferences for early resolution of uncertainty as
these risks are nonstationary and thus truly ”long-run.” As in Bansal and Yaron (2004),
these sources of uncertainty will likely command high risk prices.
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Chapter 12
Appendix
12.1 Existing literature and alternative approaches for pa-
rameter, state, and model uncertainty.
Our paper is related to a large literature studying the asset pricing implications of param-
eter or state learning. Most of this literature focuses on learning about a single unknown
parameter or state variable (assuming the other parameters and/or states are known) that
determines dividend dynamics and power utility. For example, Timmerman (1993) con-
siders the effect of uncertainty on the average level of dividend growth, assuming other
parameters are known, and shows in simple discounted cash-flow setting that parameter
learning generates excess volatility and patterns consistent with the predictability evidence
(see also Timmerman 1996). Lewellen and Shanken (2002) study the impact of learning
about mean cash-flow parameters with exponential utility with a particular focus on return
predictability.
Veronesi (2000) considers the case of learning about mean-dividend growth rates in a
model with underlying dividend dynamics with power utility and focuses on the role of signal
precision or information quality. Pastor and Veronesi (2003, 2006) study uncertainty about
a fixed dividend-growth rate or profitability levels with an exogenously specified pricing
kernel, in part motivated in order to derive cross-sectional implications. Weitzman (2007)
and Bakshi and Skoulakis (2009) consider uncertainty over volatility.
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Cogley and Sargent (2008) consider a 2-state Markov-switching model, parameter un-
certainty over one of the transition probabilities, tilt beliefs to generate robustness via
pessimistic beliefs, and use power utility. After calibrating the priors to the 1930s experi-
ence, they simulate data from a true model calibrated to the post War experience to show
how priced parameter uncertainty and concerns for robustness impact asset prices, in terms
of the finite sample distribution over various moments.
A number of papers consider state uncertainty, where the state evolves discretely via a
Markov switching model or smoothing via a Gaussian process. Moore and Shaller (1996)
consider consumption/dividend based Markov switching models with state learning and
power utility. Brennen and Xia (2001) consider the problem of learning about dividend
growth which is not a fixed parameter but a mean-reverting stochastic process, with power
utility. Veronesi (2004) studies the implications of learning about a peso state in a Markov
switching model with power utility. David and Veronesi (2010) consider a Markov switching
model with learning about states.
In the case of Epstein-Zin utility, Brandt, Zeng, and Zhang (2004) consider alternative
rules for learning about an unknown Markov state, assuming all parameters and the model
is known. Lettau, Ludvigson, and Wachter (2008) consider information structures where
the economic agents observe the parameters but learn about states in Markov switching
consumption based asset pricing model. Chen and Pakos (2008) consider learning about
the mean of consumption growth which is a Markov switching process. Ai (2010) studies
learning in a production-based long-run risks model with Kalman learning about a persistent
latent state variable. Bansal and Shaliastovich (2008) and Shaliastovich (2010) consider
learning about the persistent component in a Bansal and Yaron (2004) style model with
sub-optimal Kalman learning.
Additionally, some papers consider combinations of parameter or model uncertainty and
robustness, see, e.g., Hansen and Sargent (2000,2009) and Hansen (2008).
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12.2 Econometrics
This section briefly reviews the mechanics of sequential Bayesian learning and introduces
the econometric methods needed to solve the high-dimensional learning problem. For ease
of exposition, we abstract here from the problem of model uncertainty and drop the depen-
dence on the model specification. Model uncertainty can be dealt with easily in a fashion
analogous to the problem considered here.
The agent begins with initial beliefs over the parameters and states, p (θ, st) = p (st|θ) p (θ),
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for each t, which is needed for sequential





, as it is high-dimensional and the dependence on the data is complicated





. Johannes and Polson (2008) developed the general approach we
use, and it was extended and applied to Markov switching models by Carvalho, Johannes,
Lopes, and Polson (2010a, 2010b) and Carvalho, Lopes and Polson (2009). Details of the
algorithms are given in those papers.
The first step of the approach, data augmentation, introduces a conditional sufficient
statistics, Tt, for the parameters. Sufficient statistics imply that the full posterior distri-
bution of the parameters conditional on entire history of latent states and data takes a
known functional form conditional on a vector of sufficient statistics: p
(
θ|st, yt) = p (θ|Tt),
where p (θ|Tt) is a known distribution. The conditional sufficient statistics are given by
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Tt+1 = T (Tt, st+1, yt+1), where the function T (·) is analytically known, which implies the
sufficient statistics can be recursively updated. For Markov switching models, the sufficient
statistics contain random variables such as the number of times and duration of each state
visit, the mean and variance of yt in those visits, etc. This step requires conjugate priors.


















By the definition of sufficient statistics and the use of conjugate priors, p (θ|Tt) is a known
distribution (e.g., normal). This transforms the problem of sequential learning of param-
eters and states into one of sequential learning of states and sufficient statistics, and then





, is fixed as the sample size increases.



















where δ is a Dirac mass. A particle filtering algorithm merely consists of a recursive al-
gorithm for generating new particles, (θ, Tt+1, st+1)
(i), given existing particles and a new
observation, yt+1. The approach developed in Johannes and Polson (2008) and Carvalho,
Johannes, Lopes, and Polson (2009a, 2009b) generates a direct or exact sample from
pN (θ, Tt, st|yt), without resorting to importance sampling or other approximate methods.
The algorithm is straightforward to code and runs extremely quickly so that it is possible
to run for large values N , which is required to keep the Monte Carlo error low. These draws
can be used to estimate parameters and states variables.
In addition to sequential parameter estimation, particle filters can also be used for
Bayesian model comparison. Bayesian model comparison and hypothesis testing utilizes
the Bayes factor, essentially a likelihood ratio between competing specifications. Formally,
given a number of competing model specifications, generically labeled as model Mk and
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Mj , the Bayesian approach computes the probability of model k as:
p


















is the marginal likelihood of observation yt+1, given data up to time t in model k. Marginal
likelihoods are not known analytically and are difficult to compute even using MCMC




, it is straight-
forward to estimate marginal likelihoods via






yt+1| (θ, st)(i) ,Mk
)
.
For all of our empirical results, we ran particle filtering algorithms with N = 10K
particles. We performed extensive simulations to insure that this number of particles insured
a low and negligible Monte Carlo error.
12.3 Priors
Table 12.1 shows the prior parameters for the three different models we consider. The his-
torical and look-ahead priors are different along some important dimensions. In particular,
pre-WW2 consumption data is a lot more volatile than the post-war data (annual standard
deviation of 4.8% in the pre-WW2 data versus 1.36% in post-WW2 data). This has been,
in part, attributed to inferior pre-war data that is more noisy and sample that contains a
more cyclical component of the economy (Romer, 1989). What is true, nevertheless, is that
recessions were more frequent and lasted longer in the pre-WW2 data, and that the Great
Depression was a worse recession than ever experienced afterwards, current crisis included.
This is reflected in the disaster state in the 3-state models, in particular for the historical
prior, akin to the disaster risk considered in Barro (2008).
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For the historical prior, we have estimated, respectively, the 2- and 3-state models
starting with very flat priors on the annual Shiller data. The posterior obtained at the
end of the pre-war sample is transformed into a prior for the quarterly post-WW2 sample
by dividing the average expected means and standard deviations within each regime by 4,
and the average transition probability matrix, Π, is taken to the power of 1/4. This is of
necessity somewhat ad hoc - first, a 2-state model on annual data does not imply a 2-state
model on quarterly data; second, one would usually divide standard deviations by 2 to go
from annual to quarterly. However, a large fraction of the pre-WW2 excess volatility is
likely due to noisy data, which is not what we intend to capture with our prior. What
is more, applying priors where the mean belief of the standard deviation of consumption
growth within each regime is counter-factually high, leads to a state identification issue: the
difference in the average beliefs of the mean within each state is too small relative to the
volatilities and so the procedure cannot identify the separate states.
The look-ahead priors have mean values equal to the posterior from the corresponding
historical priors in 2009:Q1. These are very close to what would be the maximum likelihood
estimates obtained from estimating the 2- and 3-state models using the post-WW2 quar-
terly sample. The look-ahead priors have lower consumption growth volatility and higher
persistence of the good state relative to the historical priors. Thus, the look-ahead prior
reflects an expectation in 1947:Q1 of the world having higher growth and lower volatility
than in the period before WW2. In terms of the tightness of the priors, the expansion state
(always state 1), which has occurred the most, has the tightest priors, the recession state
(state 2) has flatter priors as this state is visited less often, while the disaster state (state
3), for the 3-state models, has the flattest priors. This state is the one agents has the least
information about, as it is a rare event.
For the extended model with both consumption and GDP growth, the priors are set to
match the consumption-only model as much as possible to minimize the priors’ effect on
the comparison of the models. Since the means of the hidden state variable are equal to
the means of the consumption growth in each state, the priors of these means are the same
as in the consumption-only model. We also match the prior means of the total variance
of consumption growth with similar flatness. However, since the specification allows for
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idiosyncratic noise in consumption growth (σcε
c
t), we set both the mean of the variance of
the hidden state variable in each state and the mean of the variance of the noise component
to half of the prior mean of the total variance of consumption growth, with similar flatness.
This way, the total prior mean variance of consumption growth, is the same as in the
consumption only case. The priors for the transition probabilities are the same as in the
consumption only case. For α and β in the GDP growth equation, the prior mean is -0.2
for α and 1.2 for β, and prior standard deviation is 0.45 for both. Finally, the prior mean of
the idiosyncratic component of the variance of GDP growth is set by matching the variance
of the GDP growth in the post-war data.
12.4 Time-Averaging of Consumption Data and Model Prob-
abilities
The aggregate consumption data is time-averaged, which has implications for the volatility
and autocorrelation structure of measured consumption growth. In particular, Working
(1960) shows that time-averaging of i.i.d. data leads to lower variance (the variance is de-
creased by a factor of 1.5) and an autocorrelation of 0.25. Time-averaging can therefore
artificially lead us to conclude that consumption growth follows a non-i.i.d. process (e.g.,
as we would get in the 2-state model with persistent states). Further, Hall (1978) argues
theoretically and empirically that consumption growth is close to i.i.d. To ensure the rejec-
tion of the i.i.d. model we document in the paper is not an artifact of the time-averaging,
we here assume the null hypothesis that consumption growth is in fact i.i.d., and remove
the autocorrelation induced by time-averaging by creating the following residuals:
νc,t = ∆ct − 0.25 ∗∆ct−1. (12.2)
We then redo the filtration exercise (parameters and models) and assign a prior probability
of the i.i.d. model of 0.95. Figure 12.1 shows that also in this case, even with the strong
model prior imposed, the i.i.d. model is rejected by the Bayesian agent about half-way
through the sample.
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Figure 12.1: Model Probabilities and Time-Averaging of Consumption Data
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12.5 Model solution and pricing
Here we give the details for how the prices of the consumption and aggregate equity claim
in Section 4 are computed. At each point in time t, we price the equity claim given a set of
model parameters, which are set equal to the mean beliefs at the time. The i.i.d. 2-state
model, and the general 2- and 3-state models have parameters:
θ(1) = {µ1, µ2, σ1, σ2, pi11}
θ(2) = {µ1, µ2, σ1, σ2, pi11, pi22} ,
θ(3) = {µ1, µ2, µ3, σ1, σ2, σ3, pi11, pi12, pi22, pi23, pi13, pi33} ,
respectively. In addition, there is the probability that the i.i.d 2-state model is the correct
model, the probability that the general 2-state model is the correct model versus the residual
probability of the 3-state model being the correct model. We also set these probabilities
as constants when the agent prices the equity claim. Denote these probabilities p1, p2, and
p3 = 1 − p1 − p2. Thus, there is a total of 25 parameters that all are estimated using the
particle filter and realized consumption (and GDP) data in real time. These mean parameter
estimates will change at each time t, but we do not give the parameters time-subscripts to
highlight that they are assumed to be constant following the anticipated utility framework
in the pricing problem at each time t. In addition, there are the preference parameters γ, ψ,
β, which are set to the values used in Bansal and Yaron (2004), and the leverage factor λ and
the idiosyncratic dividend growth volatility σd. These parameters remain constant over the
sample. When solving for the price-dividend ratio, we can and do ignore the idiosyncratic
component of dividend growth.
First, we have to solve for the wealth-consumption ratio, PC. At each time t, the




















))θ |It]1/θ , (12.3)





t , and where It is the agent’s information set which includes the mean parameter values
used as constant parameters, as well as the mean state beliefs. The state-variable s
(2)
t is
the belief that the economy is in state 1 in the 2-state model. Remember that the states
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are still hidden, even though all the parameters are set to constants, so this belief will have
a support of (0, 1). Similarly, s˜
(3)
t is the 2 × 1 vector of state belief probabilities from the
3-state model – the probability of being in state 1 and the probability of being in state 2.
In the model solution, the agent updates beliefs about s(2) and s˜(3) only by observing
realized consumption growth – he does not know which model is the true model, or which
state is the current state, so this uncertainty must be integrated out in the model solution.
Below is a conceptual algorithm for the model solution.1




on a grid for the 3 state variables, which all have support (0, 1).
2. For each value of s(2), s˜(3) on the grid, do points 3. – 8. below:
3. Draw a model (the i.i.d. 2-state mode, or the general 2-state or 3-state model) ac-
cording to the model probabilities p1, p2, and p3.
4. Draw the current state of this model (state 1, state 2 (or state 3)), using the state




t . Note: this step is irrelevant for
the i.i.d. 2-state model.
5. Given the model and the state, draw a random standard normal shock εt+1, and
compute consumption growth as
∆ct+1 = µM,j + σM,jεt+1, (12.4)
where the subscript M refers to the model and the subscript j refers to the state in the
same model. The parameters are assumed known and constant as discussed above.
6. Given observed log consumption growth (∆ct+1) (the agent does not observe the shock
ε), update the agent’s belief using Bayes’ rule. When finding s
(2)
t+1, condition on the
2-state model being the correct model, and when finding s˜
(3)
t+1, condition on the 3-state
1In actually solving the model, we employ numerical integration and not Monte Carlo simulation to find
the wealth-consumption ratio. We compute the price-dividend ratio by summing over zero-coupon dividend
claims. While we implement the model solution in this way for faster and more accurate model solution,
this additional level of detail is not necessary for conceptually understanding how prices are computed.
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model being the correct model. See, e.g., Hamilton (1994) for how to update beliefs
in switching regime models such as the ones considered here. Note that one has to
update the belief for both models (s(2) and s˜(3)), even though in the simulation of






t+1 and the initial guess for PC, we have all we need to evaluate the
expression inside the expectation of Equation (12.3).
8. Repeat 3.−7. many times and take the average of the different values calculated for the
expression inside the expectation of Equation (12.3). Use this average as an estimate




found for the current place in the grid for s(2) and s˜(3).






10. Iterate on 2. – 9. until a suitable convergence criterion for the PC function has been
achieved.









must be computed in this way for each t, as the parameters will change at
each time t. This is the anticipated utility component of the pricing. Denote the price-









The price-dividend ratio can be found similarly, by iterating on the below expression in



























) )θ−1 (1 + PDt (s(2)t+1, s˜(3)t+1)) |It
 .
(12.5)
Finally, the returns to the equity claim are calculated as follows. For the return from
time t to time t+ 1:





t equal to the mean state beliefs at time t (after parameter uncertainty
is integrated out).













t+1 equal to the mean state beliefs at time t + 1 (after parameter
uncertainty is integrated out).





















where εt+1 is a draw from a standard normal distribution independent of everything
else. These simulated shocks are constrained to have mean zero and variance one







= 1 (in practice, extremely close
to 1). This is done to ensure that the level of the in-sample average equity return
and equity return volatility are not affected by the (by chance) high or low draw
of the idiosyncratic component of dividends, or (by chance) high or low volatility of
idiosyncratic dividend growth.
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Table 12.1: Priors Specification
Historical priors
Priors for i.i.d. model Priors for 2-state model Priors for 3-state model
Par. Mean St.Dev Par. Mean St.Dev Par. Mean St.Dev
µ 0.9% 0.5% µ1 1.0% 0.25% µ1 1.0% 0.25%
µJ −2.0% 0.5% µ2 −0.5% 0.5% µ2 −0.4% 0.5%
µ3 −2.0% 1.5%
σ2 (0.7%)2 (0.7%)2 σ21 (0.5%)
2 (0.5%)2 σ21 (0.5%)
2 (0.5%)2
σ2J (1.0%)
2 (1.0%)2 σ22 (1.0%)




λ 0.05 0.05 pi11 0.95 0.034 pi11 0.95 0.034
pˆi12 0.80 0.16
pˆi21 0.80 0.16




Priors for i.i.d. model Priors for 2-state model Priors for 3-state model
Par. Mean St.Dev Par. Mean St.Dev Par. Mean St.Dev
µ 0.63% 0.22% µ1 0.68% 0.18% µ1 0.68% 0.18%
µJ −1.2% 0.25% µ2 0.2% 0.5% µ2 0.3% 0.5%
µ3 −1.14% 0.5%
σ2 (0.45%)2 (0.45%)2 σ21 (0.36%)
2 (0.36%)2 σ21 (0.35%)
2 (0.35%)2
σ2J (0.55%)
2 (0.55%)2 σ22 (0.7%)




λ 0.05 0.05 pi11 0.95 0.034 pi11 0.95 0.034
pˆi12 0.83 0.14
pˆi21 0.67 0.24
pi22 0.80 0.16 pi22 0.75 0.19
pˆi31 0.50 0.29
pi33 0.33 0.24
